The creation of a new Human Rights Council
represents a major achievement, but it is only a first step.
In the past two years, the adjective ‘discredited’ has been
used consistently by the vast majority of Governments and
other observers to describe the Commission on Human Rights.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that it was only
the former Commission which was discredited. The real
challenge emerging from this period of upheaval and renewal
is to re-establish the credibility of the United Nations
itself to protect human rights effectively, consistently,
and fairly. Whether the Council will rise to that challenge
remains very much an open question. If it fails, a great
deal of damage will be done to the credibility and standing
of the Organization as a whole.
It is often said that the system of special
procedures constitute the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Council.
But they are in fact much more than that. They provide the
outside world with the sense that someone cares, they
provide the most tangible indication that governments take
their commitments to accountability seriously by engaging in
a meaningful dialogue, and they provide the Council with the
factual information, collected on the ground and often at
significant risk, on issues and situations of major
importance.
In my report, I point to one of the ways in
which this system risks being undermined. The failure of
states to issue the invitations sought in response to my
requests has reached close to crisis proportions. 19 of the
22 countries to which I have directed requests have either
failed altogether to respond or have proved unable to make
any concrete progress on arrangements for a potential visit.
While I can understand that my mandate might make me little
more popular than the ‘grim reaper’ in some circles, the
fact remains that extrajudicial executions go to the very
heart of the worst violations of human rights and it is
essential that a credible Human Rights Council be able to
address these issues systematically. It is especially
problematic to note that eight of those 19 countries are
Council members, each of whom specifically undertook to
‘uphold the highest standards in the promotion and
protection of human rights, [and to] fully cooperate with
the Council’ (GA Res. 60/251, para. 9). This General
Assembly should specifically call upon those States to
uphold their commitments to cooperate with the Council and
their procedures.
Permit me to say, Mr Chairman, that I am
deeply troubled that, rather than addressing such issues, a
great deal of the energy that I perceive within the Council
has instead been devoted to endeavours designed to change
the rules of the game in such a way that the special
procedures would be severely constrained in their ability to
achieve their objectives. In the face of such initiatives
many of those most concerned with the credibility of the
system appear almost complacent and reluctant to acknowledge
the effort which will be required if the system of special
procedures is to be preserved in a form that does not bring
the adjective ‘discredited’ to be applied to the Council as
well.
The concept of ‘early warning’ has received
enormous attention and support in recent years. The theory
is that an early warning makes possible a response that is
prompt enough to prevent what would otherwise become an
intractable crisis with an intolerable human toll. The
practice, however, sometimes appears to be one of an alarm
followed by silence followed by disaster. The problem, of
course, is that when the alarm sounds, Governments and
others can opt to simply put in their ear plugs, hope for
the best, and express surprise when disaster strikes.
Today the alarm is sounding for Sri Lanka.
It is on the brink of a crisis of major proportions. Sadly,
the world seems to think that the dramatic attacks of recent
days and the spiraling number of extrajudicial executions
are just one more episode in a long-running saga. There is a
perception that Sri Lanka is not so much on the brink of a
new crisis but, instead, only in the midst of an
interminable and intractable crisis that has already
exhausted its fair share of international attention. This
perception is inaccurate and dangerous. Widespread violence
during a faltering ceasefire is not the same as an all-out
civil war that costs tens of thousands of lives. Real
progress has been made over the past four years, and nothing
that has happened in these past few months has made
achieving a sustainable peace founded on respect for human
rights impossible. But there is little reason to think that
the opportunity will be available for much longer.
The issue was placed squarely before the
Human Rights Council last month, but the signals are that
any action the Council might take in November will do very
little to make a difference as this tragic situation swells
and threatens to reach bursting point. What can and should
be done?
The first challenge is to acknowledge the
need for significantly more sustained and high-level
international involvement than has thus far been the case in
efforts to pressure the parties to move towards a peaceful
resolution of the conflict. This is still a conflict that
can be resolved, but the parties will not get there on their
own.
The second challenge is to accept the fact
that there is no national institution capable of monitoring
human rights throughout Sri Lanka. I have welcomed some of
the Government’s recent initiatives. It would be a mistake,
however, to think that the national commission of inquiry
will be anywhere near sufficient to meet the challenge. This
is so even if the Government undertakes, as I believe it now
should, to make public all of its findings and to act
affirmatively on its recommendations.
The third challenge is to establish an
effective international human rights monitoring presence.
This is not a pro forma recommendation. There are reasons to
believe that in Sri Lanka, in particular, international
human rights monitoring could make a real contribution both
to protecting individuals and to creating the conditions for
a sustainable peace.
First, human rights is the appropriate
language: The discourse of human rights is central to the
parties’ own understanding of the conflict’s origins and
conduct, and much of the human toll is the product of
quintessential human rights violations - the targeting of
civilians and the execution of individuals for the exercise
of their civil and political rights. Moreover, a sustainable
peace settlement will prove elusive until the Government,
the LTTE, or both, demonstrate genuine respect for the human
rights of all communities.
Second, the international community has a
recognized and powerful role: This is ultimately a struggle
for legitimacy, not territory, and the Government and the
LTTE recognize the strategic importance of achieving and
maintaining international legitimacy.
Third, monitoring would affect conduct: The
parties feel that they are able to violate human rights and
humanitarian law without losing international legitimacy so
long as they commit abuses in a manner that permits them
maximum deniability. Monitoring could foreclose the strategy
of deniability and push the parties to show actual respect
rather than simulated respect for human rights.
My report thus urges the General Assembly to
‘call upon the United Nations Secretariat to establish a
full-fledged international human rights monitoring mission
in Sri Lanka’.
