"Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more
than overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form
of terrorism whose complete demise is unlikely in the 21st century"
October 23, 1983, was one of the most horrific days in the
history of modern terrorism. Two massive explosions destroyed the barracks
of the U.S. and French contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force
in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American servicemen and 58 French
paratroopers. Both explosions were carried out by Muslim extremists who
drove to the heart of the target area and detonated bombs with no intention
of escaping. Subsequent suicide attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in
Lebanon and Kuwait made it clear that a new type of killing had entered the
repertoire of modern terrorism: a suicide operation in which the success of
the attack depends on the death of the perpetrator.
This tactic stunned security experts. Two centuries of experience
suggested that terrorists, though ready to risk their lives, wished to live
after the terrorist act in order to benefit from its accomplishments. But
this new terrorism defied that belief. It seemed qualitatively different,
appearing almost supernatural, extremely lethal, and impossible to stop.
Within six months, French and U.S. Presidents François Mitterrand and Ronald
Reagan pulled their troops out of Lebanon-a tacit admission that the new
terrorism rendered all known counterterrorist measures useless. Government
officials erected concrete barriers around the White House and sealed the
Pentagon's underground bus tunnels. Nobody was reassured. As Time magazine
skeptically observed in 1983: "No security expert thinks such defensive
measures will stop a determined Islamic terrorist who expects to join Allah
by killing some Americans."
Whereas the press lost no time in labeling these bombers irrational
zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal, arguing
that suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over "conventional"
terrorism: It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes
or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and
extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time,
location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that
interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their
deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the
media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness). Dr. Ramadan Shalah,
secretary- general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, summarized the chilling
logic of the new terror tactic: "Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated
weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard. . . .
We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except
the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives. . . human
bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs."
The prevalence of suicide terrorism during the last two decades
testifies to its gruesome effectiveness [see table on opposite page]. It has
formed a vital part of several terror campaigns, including Hezbollah's
successful operation against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the
mid-1980s, the 1994-96 Hamas bus bombings aimed at stopping the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the 1995-99 Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK) struggle against Turkey. The formation of special suicide units within
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) army in Sri Lanka has added an
atrocious dimension to the civil war on that devastated island. In addition
to killing hundreds of civilians, soldiers, and high-ranking officers since
1987, LTTE suicide terrorists have assassinated two heads of state: Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of
Sri Lanka in 1993. Sri Lanka's current president, Chandrika Kumaratunga,
recently lost sight in one eye following an assassination attempt that
killed at least 24 people. The simultaneous 1998 bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which took the lives of nearly 300
civilians, were a brutal reprise of the 1983 tragedies in Lebanon.
Almost 20 years after its stunning modern debut, suicide terrorism
continues to carry the image of the "ultimate" terror weapon. But is this
tactic as unstoppable as it seems? The experiences of the last two decades
have yielded important insights into the true nature of suicide
bombers-insights that demystify their motivations and strategies, expose
their vulnerabilities, and suggest ways to defeat what a senior State
Department official once called a "frightening" problem to which there are
"no answers."
Average, Everyday Martyrs
A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism
existed many years before "truck bombs" became part of the global
vernacular. As early as the 11th century, the Assassins, Muslim fighters
living in northern Persia, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to
advance the cause of Islam. In the 18th century the Muslim communities of
the Malabar Coast in India, Atjeh in Sumatra, and Mindanao and Sulu in the
southern Philippines resorted to suicide attacks when faced with European
colonial repression. These perpetrators never perceived their deaths as
suicide. Rather, they saw them as acts of martyrdom in the name of the
community and for the glory of God.
Moreover, suicide terrorism, both ancient and modern, is not merely the
product of religious fervor, Islamic or otherwise. Martha Crenshaw, a
leading terrorism scholar at Wesleyan University, argues that the mind-set
of a suicide bomber is no different from those of Tibetan self-immolators,
Irish political prisoners ready to die in a hunger strike, or dedicated
terrorists worldwide who wish to live after an operation but know their
chances of survival are negligible. Seen in this light, suicide terrorism
loses its demonic uniqueness. It is merely one type of martyrdom venerated
by certain cultures or religious traditions but rejected by others who favor
different modes of supreme sacrifice.
Acts of martyrdom vary not only by culture, but also by specific
circumstances. Tel Aviv University psychologist Ariel Merari has conducted
the most comprehensive study of individuals who commit acts of suicide
terrorism. After profiling more than 50 Muslim suicide bombers serving in
Hezbollah, Amal, and secular pro-Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, he concluded that there
is no single psychological or demographic profile of suicide terrorists. His
findings suggest that intense struggles produce several types of people with
the potential willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause [see sidebar
on page 70]. Furthermore, Merari maintains that no organization can create a
person's basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce
but rather to identify this predisposition in candidates and reinforce it.
Recruiters will often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be
bombers, using their subjects' faith in a reward in paradise to strengthen
and solidify preexisting sacrificial motives. But other powerful motives
reinforce tendencies toward martyrdom, including patriotism, hatred of the
enemy, and a profound sense of victimization.
Since suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon, the struggle
against it cannot be conducted on an individual level. Although profiling
suicide bombers may be a fascinating academic challenge, it is less relevant
in the real-world struggle against them than understanding the modus
operandi and mind-set of terrorist leaders who would never consider killing
themselves, but opt for suicide terrorism as a result of cold reasoning.
The Care and Feeding of a Suicide Bomber
A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long
organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to
launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at least
six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering,
recruitment, physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives,
and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Such a mission
often involves dozens of terrorists and accomplices who have no intention of
committing suicide, but without whom no suicide operation could take place.
A careful survey of all the organizations that have resorted to suicide
terrorism since 1983 suggests that the most meaningful distinction among
them involves the degree to which suicide bombing is institutionalized. At
the simplest level are groups that neither practice suicide terrorism on a
regular basis nor approve of its use as a tactic. Local members or
affiliates of such organizations, however, may initiate it on their own for
a variety of reasons, such as imitating the glorious acts of others,
responding to a perception of enormous humiliation and distress, avenging
the murder of comrades and relatives, or being presented with a special
opportunity to strike.
Within such a context, it is important to take into account what might
be called "pre-suicide terrorism." Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
suicide operations in Israel during the 1990s were preceded by a wave of
knifings in the late 1980s. These attackers never planned an escape route
and were often killed on the spot. The knifings did not involve any known
organization and were mostly spontaneous. But they expressed a collective
mood among young Palestinians of jihad (holy war) against Israel that helped
create an atmosphere for the institutionalized suicide terrorism of the next
decade.
Many terrorist groups are skeptical of suicide terrorism's strategic
value but resort to this tactic in exceptional circumstances. Within this
category are the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
(allegedly executed by Osama bin Laden's Qaida organization) and similar
irregular attacks conducted over the years by the Egyptian Islamic Group,
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kuwaiti Dawa, and the Algerian Armed Islamic
Group, among others. Such suicide bombings, though carefully planned, are
irregular and unsystematic.
At another level are groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a
temporary strategy. The leaders of these movements obtain (or grant)
ideological or theological legitimization for its use, recruit and train
volunteers, and then send them into action with a specific objective in
mind. The most spectacular operations of Hezbollah between 1983 and 1985, of
Hamas between 1994 and 1996, and of the PKK between 1995 and 1999 fall
within this category. More recently, Chechen rebels suddenly launched a
campaign of suicide bombings following nine months of inconclusive fighting
against the Russian military; one of the first bombers, a cousin of noted
rebel leader Arbi Barayev, had reportedly declared: "I am going willingly to
my death in the name of Allah and the freedom of the Chechen people."
In such cases, the institutionalization of suicide terrorism has been
temporary and conditional. Leaders who opt for this type of terrorism are
usually moved by an intense sense of crisis, a conviction in the
effectiveness of this new tactic, endorsement by the religious or
ideological establishment, and the enthusiastic support of their community.
At the same time, they are fully aware of the changeable nature of these
conditions and of the potential costs associated with suicide terrorism
(such as devastating military retaliation). They consequently have little
difficulty in suspending suicide bombing or calling it off entirely.
A case in point is Hezbollah's decision to begin suicide bombings in
1983. It is known today that several leaders of the organization were
extremely uneasy about the practice. Insisting that Islam does not approve
of believers taking their own lives, clerics such as Sheikh Fadlallah raised
legal objections and were unwilling to allow the use of this new tactic.
However, suicide terrorism became so effective in driving foreigners out of
Lebanon that there was no motivation to stop it. The result was theological
hair splitting that characterized suicide bombers as exceptional soldiers
who risked their lives in a holy war. But following the Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon in 1985 and the decreasing effectiveness of this tactic,
Hezbollah's clerics ordered the end of systematic suicide bombing. The
organization's fighters were instructed to protect their lives and continue
the struggle against the Zionists through conventional guerrilla methods.
Only rarely, and on an irregular basis, has Hezbollah allowed suicide
bombing since.
It is not exactly clear when the commanders of Hamas decided to turn
their anti-Israel suicide attacks into a strategic struggle against the
peace process. Their campaign, started haphazardly in 1992 against Israeli
military and settler targets in the occupied territories, failed to produce
glaring results. The 1994 Hebron Massacre, when Israeli doctor Baruch
Goldstein murdered 29 praying Palestinians, changed everything. Determined
to avenge the deaths of their countrymen, Hamas operators resorted to
suicide bus bombings inside Israeli cities. In a matter of weeks, the new
wave of terrorism had eroded Israel's collective confidence in the peace
process and had played right into the hands of extremist Hamas clerics who
opposed negotiations with Israel. Yet, in 1995 these attacks suddenly came
to a complete halt. Several factors convinced Hamas leaders to back off: the
growing Palestinian resentment against the costs of the bus bombings
(expressed in massive Israeli economic sanctions), the increasing
cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services, and the
effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism.
Ironically, Israel unintentionally pushed the organization to resume the
bus bombings when, in 1996, then Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered the
assassination of Yehiya Ayash (known as "the Engineer") -a Hamas operative
who masterminded many of the previous suicide bombings. Humiliated and
angered, Hamas temporarily resumed bus bombings in Israel. A series of three
successful attacks by Hamas and one by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad changed
Israel's political mood about the peace process and led to the 1996
electoral defeat of Peres and his pro-peace government.
In the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas, no permanent suicide units were
formed, and bombers were recruited and trained on an ad hoc, conditional
basis. But, in rare instances, some organizations adopt suicide terrorism as
a legitimate and permanent strategy, harkening back to the Japanese kamikaze
pilots of the Second World War.
Currently, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers are the only example of this
phenomenon. The "Black Tigers" launched their first attack in July 1987, and
since then suicide bombings have become an enduring feature of the LTTE's
ruthless struggle. During the last 13 years, 171 attacks have killed
hundreds of civilians and soldiers and wounded thousands more. The
assassinations of two heads of state, political leaders, and high-ranking
military officers have made it clear that no politician or public figure is
immune to these attacks.
The Black Tigers constitute the most significant proof that suicide
terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain
extreme political and psychological circumstances secular volunteers are
fully capable of martyrdom. The Tamil suicide bombers are not the product of
a religious cult, but rather a cult of personality: Velupillai Pirabaharan,
the brutal and charismatic LTTE leader who initiated the practice, appears
to have been greatly influenced by the spectacular successes of Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Fiercely determined to fight the repressive Sinhalese government
until the Tamils achieve independence, Pirabaharan created the suicide units
largely by the strength of his personality and his unlimited control of the
organization.
The formation of the Black Tigers was greatly facilitated by an early
practice of the organization's members: Since the early 1980s, all LTTE
fighters-male and female alike-have been required to carry potassium cyanide
capsules. A standard LTTE order makes it unequivocally clear that soldiers
are to consume the capsule's contents if capture is imminent. The LTTE
suicide units are essentially an extension of the organization's general
culture of supreme martyrdom; the passage from ordinary combat soldier to
suicide bomber is a short and tragic journey.
Making Suicide Terrorists Pay
The perceived strength of suicide bombers is that they are
lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness of
suicide bombers is that they are nothing more than the instruments of
terrorist leaders who expect their organizations to gain tangible benefits
from this shocking tactic. The key to countering suicide bombers, therefore,
is to make terrorist organizations aware that this decision will incur
painful costs. While no simple formula for countering suicide terrorism
exists, the experiences of the last two decades suggest two complementary
political and operational strategies.
Organizations only implement suicide terrorism systematically if their
community (and, in some cases, a foreign client state) approves of its use.
Thus, political and economic sanctions against the terrorists' community,
combined with effective coercive diplomacy against their foreign patrons,
may help reduce or end suicide terrorism. The problem with political
counterterrorism, however, is that it takes a long time to implement and the
results are never certain. The Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance,
continue to host Osama bin Laden (who was indicted by the United States in
November 1998 for the bombings of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa)
despite international sanctions, a unanimously adopted United Nations
Security Council Resolution demanding that he stand trial, and a threat from
the United States that the Taliban will be held responsible for any
terrorist acts undertaken while Bin Laden is under their protection.
The leaders of organizations that resort to suicide terrorism are
evidently ready to take great risks. Consequently, the political battle
against suicide bombers must always be enhanced by an aggressive operational
campaign. Governments do not have to invent entirely new tactics when waging
a war against suicide terrorists. Instead, they must adapt and intensify
existing counterterrorism strategies to exploit the vulnerabilities of
suicide bombers.
The Achilles' heel of suicide terrorists is that they
are part of a large, operational infrastructure. It may not be possible to
profile and apprehend would-be suicide bombers, but once it has been
established that an organization has resolved to use suicide terrorism,
security services can strike against the commanders and field officers who
recruit and train the assailants and then plan the attacks. This
counterterrorism effort calls for the formation of effective networks of
informers, the constant monitoring of potential collaborators, and close
cooperation among international intelligence services. Counterterrorist
operatives must apply consistent pressure on the terrorist infrastructure
through harassment and attacks. They must also seek ways to cut off the
terrorists' sources of funding by depriving organizations of their financial
resources (such as international bank accounts or "front" businesses).
Regardless of the presence or absence of hard evidence for planned
operations, it is essential to put potential terrorists on the run.
The physical protection of potential target areas is another essential
tactic. The idea of erecting concrete barriers against a martyr driving a
truck loaded with tons of explosives might strike some as ludicrously
inadequate. But such physical protection serves two essential objectives: It
reduces the effect of the suicide bombing if and when the terrorist hits the
target area, and it serves as a deterrent against potential suicide strikes.
For the terrorist field officers, who may never know when they will be
caught or killed, each suicide squad is precious. When faced with highly
protected areas, they are unlikely to send squads into action. Roadblocks,
guards at special checkpoints, inspection teams in public places, and the
use of dogs and artificial sniffing devices may drive suicide terrorism down
significantly.
Such security measures also reassure the public. Governments must never
forget that terrorism constitutes a form of psychological warfare, and that
suicide terrorism is the ultimate expression of this struggle. Terrorism
must always be fought psychologically-a battle that often takes place in the
minds of ordinary people. Even if governments do not have an immediate
operational solution to suicide terrorism, they must convince their citizens
that they are not sitting ducks and that the authorities are doing
everything they can to protect them. Ordinary people should, in fact, be
informed that psychological warfare is being waged against them. Free people
who are told that they are being subjected to psychological manipulation are
likely to develop strong terrorism antibodies.
In fighting suicide bombers, it is important not to succumb to the idea
that they are ready to do anything and lose everything. This is the same
sort of simplistic reasoning that has fueled the widespread hysteria over
terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The perception that
terrorists are undeterrable fanatics who are willing to kill millions
indiscriminately just to sow fear and chaos belies the reality that they are
cold, rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political
objectives. Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more than
overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form of terrorism
whose complete demise is unlikely in the 21st century. The ongoing political
instability in the Middle East, Russia, and South Asia-including Iran,
Afghanistan, Chechnya, and possibly India and Pakistan-suggests that these
regions will continue to be high-risk areas, with irregular suicide bombings
occasionally extending to other parts of the globe. But the present
understanding of the high costs of suicide terrorism and the growing
cooperation among intelligence services worldwide gives credence to the hope
that in the future only desperate organizations of losers will try to use
this tactic on a systematic basis.
