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20/11/07 |
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"..The Struggle for Tamil Eelam is a National Question -
and it is therefore an International Question.." note by
tamilnation.org
- Given the key role played by
India
and the United States in
the Struggle for Tamil
Eelam, it is not without importance for
the Tamil people to further their own understanding of the
foreign policy objectives of these two countries - this
is more so because the record shows that states do not have
permanent friends but have only permanent interests.
And, it is these interests that
they pursue, whether overtly or covertly. Furthermore, the interests of a state are a function of the interests of groups
which wield power within that state and 'foreign policy is the external manifestation
of domestic institutions, ideologies and other attributes of the polity'.
In the end, the success of any
liberation struggle is, not surprisingly, a function of
the capacity of its leadership to mobilise its own people
and its own resources at the broadest and deepest
level." |
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International Relations
in aN ASYMMETRIC Multi Lateral World
The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: The End Game Begins
Dr. Harsh V. Pant, Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
27 January 2006
"...Much to India's chagrin, Iran's nuclear problem has once
again emerged as a complicating factor in India's
efforts to finalize its nuclear deal with the U.S. Iran
decided to remove the seals applied by the I.A.E.A. for
the purpose of verifying the suspension of Iran's P-1
centrifuge uranium enrichment program. .. In
response to this, the E.U.-3 (United Kingdom, France and
Germany) along with the U.S. have called for
an
emergency meeting of the I.A.E.A. on February 2 which
will discuss whether to refer Iran to the U.N. Security
Council.
Once again, India has come under pressure as the nature
of its decision at the meeting of the I.A.E.A. Board of
Governors could impact its own nuclear negotiations with
the U.S. In fact, U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford
went public with his warning that if India did not vote
to send Iran to the U.N. Security Council, the effect on
the deal would be "devastating" since the U.S. Congress
would "simply stop considering the matter" and the
initiative will "die." It remains to be seen if the
Indian government decides to repeat its past voting
pattern in the I.A.E.A. or succumbs to domestic pressure
emanating from its coalition partners. Nevertheless, an
open warning from the U.S. may have further muddied the
waters for the Indian government... The Bush
administration believes that it is in the strategic interests of the
United States for India to emerge as a major global power, and the
administration has made it clear that it will do its best to help
India achieve that goal. "
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During the visit of Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh to the U.S. in July 2005, the
two countries decided to turn a new leaf in their
bilateral relationship. The Bush administration declared
its ambition to achieve full civil nuclear energy
cooperation with India. In pursuit of this objective,
the Bush administration would "seek agreement from the
U.S. Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," and
would "work with friends and allies to adjust
international regimes to enable full civil nuclear
energy cooperation and trade with India, including but
not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel
supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur."
India, on its part, promised "to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same
benefits and advantages of other leading countries with
advanced nuclear technologies." The U.S.-India nuclear
pact virtually rewrote the rules of the global nuclear
regime by accepting India as a nuclear state that should
be integrated into the global nuclear order. The nuclear
agreement creates a major exception to the U.S.
prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that
does not accept international monitoring of all its
nuclear facilities. The outcome of the visit marked a
new phase in U.S.-India ties.
From the very beginning, the Bush administration refused
to look at India through the prism of non-proliferation
and viewed India as a natural and strategic ally. It
openly declared that it wants to help India become a
major world power in the 21st century. The visit of U.S.
President Bill Clinton to India in 1999, the Jaswant
Singh-Strobe Talbott strategic dialogue, the Next Steps
in Strategic Partnership which was announced during the
former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's
visit to the U.S. in 2001, all had laid the foundation
for a dramatic upswing in U.S.-India ties. [See:
"The Implications of the U.S.-India Strategic
Partnership"]
The recent agreement immediately provoked heated debate
both in the United States and in India. The impending
visit of Bush to India in early 2006 is forcing both
sides to work on the agreement so as to be able to put
the agreement into effect during the visit. India has
presented to the U.S. a plan to separate its civil and
military nuclear facilities and is now awaiting an
American response. This plan is part of India's
obligation under the U.S.-India nuclear agreement that
requires the separation of civil and military facilities
in a phased manner and filing a declaration about its
civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (I.A.E.A.).
Debate in the U.S.
Many in the U.S. looked at the deal negatively. Their
main focus was the impact that the deal would have on
other states that might be thinking of pursuing nuclear
weapons. It was argued that this was a signal to such
states that acquiring nuclear weapons could be a
stepping stone to recognition as a major global player
without any sanctions being imposed for such an
acquisition. Specifically, the issue of Pakistan was
raised in so far as Pakistan might also demand the
status given to India; as part of this argument, a
refusal to Islamabad might mean growing anti-U.S.
feelings in a state crucial for the success of
Washington's war on terrorism.
India was also criticized for its refusal to curtail the
development of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems
and for not permitting full-scope safeguards for its
military and civilian facilities. While many of these
oppositional voices see India as a major global actor in
the coming years, there are concerns over whether India
can be trusted on such critical issues as U.S.-China
relations or Iran's nuclear weapons program.
There were also many negative reactions from the U.S.
Congress. Congressional representatives argued that the
U.S. cannot afford to play favorites and break the rules
of the non-proliferation regime to favor one country at
the risk of undermining critical international treaties
in nuclear weapons. It was clear at the outset that
garnering support from Congress for the nuclear pact was
going to be an uphill task for the Bush administration.
While many U.S. lawmakers realized India's growing
strategic importance and its track record in nuclear
non-proliferation, domestic U.S. laws and India being a
non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(N.P.T.) meant that they would find it difficult to lend
their support to the Bush administration's decision to
provide India with civilian nuclear reactors.
The difficulty is that making an exception in India's
case will establish a precedent and open the U.S. to
charges that it is not committed to the
non-proliferation regime it is party to. While most
Republican members of the Congress were circumspect,
many Democratic members made it abundantly clear that
the agreement was highly controversial and even members
of the India-caucus were restrained in their views.
Moreover, the euphoria over the nuclear deal was soon
overtaken by the realities of international politics.
India was asked to prove its loyalty to the U.S. by
lining up behind Washington on the question of Iran's
nuclear program. Members of Congress were angered by the
visit of the Indian foreign minister to Iran and scolded
India during a hearing on the U.S.-India nuclear pact.
U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos went so far as to say that
India "will pay a heavy price for a total disregard of
U.S. concerns vis-à-vis Iran."
The Bush administration made it clear that if India
voted against the U.S. motion on Iran, Congress would
likely not approve the U.S.-India nuclear agreement.
Lantos later hailed the Indian vote in the I.A.E.A. and
argued that it would promote a positive consideration in
Congress of the new U.S.-India nuclear agreement. India,
on its part, has continued to claim that its vote had
nothing to do with its nuclear agreement with the United
States. [See:
"India's Interests Collide Over Iran"]
The hearings in Congress on the U.S.-India nuclear pact
have also brought to light the difficulties involved in
its ratification. Most members of Congress continue to
struggle with the question on whether the net impact of
the agreement on U.S. non-proliferation policy is
positive or negative. The majority of experts questioned
by the House Committee on International Relations have
argued that the deal weakens the international
non-proliferation regime. Only a few, such as Ashley
Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, argue that bringing "New Delhi into the global
non-proliferation regime through a lasting bilateral
agreement that defines clearly enforceable benefits and
obligations…not only strengthens American efforts to
stem further proliferation but also enhances U.S.
national security."
The hearings in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee have also brought into sharp relief the
expectations that the Bush administration has from India
in lieu of the nuclear pact. Not only were India's
attitudes vis-à-vis Iran mentioned as crucial by senior
Bush administration officials, but it was also made
clear that Washington expected India to perform in
conformity with U.S. interests. India's help in building
democratic institutions worldwide was deemed essential
for a U.S.-India partnership. India's support for the
multinational Proliferation Security Initiative was also
referred to as highly desirable.
It was made clear to the Senate that the initiation of
legislation by the Bush administration in Congress would
be based on evidence that the Indian government has
begun acting on the most important commitment of
separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities
in a credible and transparent manner.
Senator Richard Lugar, who chairs the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, made it a point to mention
in his opening statement that India's nuclear record
with the international community had been unsatisfying
and that India had "violated bilateral pledges it made
to Washington not to use U.S.-supplied nuclear materials
for weapon purposes." He forcefully reminded everyone
that an implementation of the U.S.-India nuclear accord
requires congressional consent and that it would be his
committee and Congress that would determine "what effect
the joint statement will have on U.S. efforts to halt
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."
Lugar laid down very clearly the four benchmarks that
will determine the success or failure of Congress giving
its consent to the pact. Those four questions follow:
How does civil nuclear cooperation strengthen the
U.S.-Indian strategic partnership and why is it
important? How does the pact address U.S. concerns about
India's nuclear program and policies? What effects will
it have on other proliferation challenges such as Iran
and North Korea and the export policies of Russia and
China? What impact will the nuclear agreement have on
the efficacy and future of the N.P.T. and the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime?
As if on cue, 18 former U.S. government officials and
non-proliferation experts came together to write to the
members of the Congress that it should impose additional
obligations on the U.S.-India nuclear partnership before
considering amendments to U.S. laws necessary for it to
go into effect. In this context, it is instructive to
note that Senator John Kerry, the ranking Democrat on
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed his
support for the U.S.-India nuclear deal "in principle"
during a recent visit to India and claimed that once the
deal goes through in its present form, it would accord
India the status of a nuclear power.
Even as this debate is moving apace in the U.S., the
Bush administration has taken some significant steps to
further strengthen U.S.-India civil nuclear ties. It
strongly supported India's participation in the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
(I.T.E.R.) consortium, an international enterprise aimed
at building a reactor that can use nuclear fusion as a
source of energy, and removed India's safeguard reactors
from the U.S. Department of Commerce Entities List.
It also made a strong pitch for India at the meeting of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (N.S.G.) to enable full
peaceful civil nuclear cooperation and trade with India.
In a strong signal that the Bush administration is
serious about the nuclear deal with India, the U.S.
State Department told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that it could not determine whether India's 40
megawatt nuclear reactor called Cirus had violated a
1956 U.S.-India contract which said that U.S. heavy
water could only be used for peaceful purpose. The Bush
administration has argued that it is not possible to
have a conclusive answer on whether plutonium produced
by the Cirus reactor was produced by the U.S. heavy
water reactor.
At the same time, hectic lobbying also started in
Washington. The U.S.-India Business Council, a group of
major U.S. corporations doing business in India, has
hired one of the most expensive lobbying firms in
Washington, Patton Boggs, to help ensure enactment of
legislation needed to permit the U.S. to pursue
full-scale civilian nuclear cooperation with India. The
government of India is working with its own lobbying
firms, Barbour, Griffith & Rogers, which is headed by
the former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill,
and the Venable Law firm.
Debate in India
India also experienced a range of opinions expressed on
the U.S.-India nuclear deal. The Hindu nationalist
Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.) was quick to criticize
the pact. Ironically, it was the B.J.P. that laid the
foundations of the emerging U.S.-India strategic
partnership. The architect of this partnership,
Vajpayee, argued that the Indian government had
surrendered its right to determine what kind of nuclear
deterrent it should have in the future based on its own
threat perception. Not only would the new agreement put
restrictions on the nuclear research program, Vajpayee
argued, but India would also incur huge costs on
separating military and civilian nuclear installations.
The Left parties, which are also part of the ruling
coalition in India, criticized the government for not
taking its allies into confidence before striking the
nuclear deal with Washington. They also lambasted the
government for giving up on India's long-held policy of
nuclear disarmament.
Other Indian critics of the deal claimed that America's
recognition of India as a "responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology" that should "acquire the
same benefits as other such states" falls short of
admitting it into the nuclear club. It was argued that
India obtained too little for the deal while giving up
too much. As part of the deal, India committed itself to
segregating, in a phased manner, the state's civilian
nuclear facilities, voluntarily placing its civilian
nuclear facilities under I.A.E.A. safeguards, signing
and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to
civilian nuclear facilities, continuing the unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing, working with the U.S. to
help conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,
continuing with stringent non-proliferation export
controls, and harmonization with and adherence to the
guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and
the N.S.G.
While most of these conditions had long been a part of
the U.S.-India strategic discourse, for some Indian
critics India had agreed to these conditions without
much reciprocity from the United States. Some of these
critics have expressed fears that independent research
activities oriented to peaceful purposes, including
India's fast breeder program, might be obstructed or
slowed.
The scientific community in India delivered a mixed
verdict. Some, accepting the need for nuclear energy in
the coming years, have favored the pact as it would
augment India's energy resources. The deal with the U.S.
is also viewed by many as leading the way for other
states such as Canada, France, the U.K., and Russia in
the N.S.G. to supply India with civil nuclear
technology. Others have been less than enthusiastic,
arguing that the separation of civilian and military
facilities is an onerous task and might have serious
repercussions for research and development in weapons
systems and for production facilities needed for a
nuclear deterrent. Even the Americans have conceded that
separating its civilian and nuclear facilities is an
enormously difficult task for India.
Some critics charge that the very premise of the
U.S.-India nuclear deal is flawed since meeting energy
needs by importing nuclear reactors will only lead to
energy insecurity and exorbitant costs. There were also
complaints that the scientific community was completely
kept out of the loop while making such an important
decision to seal this deal with the U.S. It seems as if
the Department of Atomic Energy (D.A.E.) in India has
still not reconciled to the deal as it continues to be
reluctant in coming out with a credible plan of
separating India's civilian and military nuclear
facilities. The latest round of talks between the Indian
foreign secretary and the U.S. under secretary of
defense ended up in a failure primarily due to D.A.E.'s
hesitation in putting its fast breeder program on the
civilian list.
Even as this debate was going on in India, New Delhi's
decision to vote in favor of the U.S.-sponsored motion
in the I.A.E.A. critical of Iran sent the Left parties
into a fury. They came out strongly against the Indian
government for not supporting a fellow member of the
Non-Aligned Movement against what they viewed as
America's hegemonic ambitions and bullying tactics.
Despite the opposition that the U.S.-India deal faces
from the Right and the Left of the political spectrum in
India, there are few who are advocating India's
withdrawal from the agreement.
For most people involved in the Indian strategic
community and media, the U.S.-India nuclear deal
affirmed the India-U.S. partnership. The deal has
generated a certain sense of euphoria since it marks an
end to India's nuclear isolation and is also seen as a
tribute to India's growing profile in the global order.
The Indian scientific establishment has started
interacting with its U.S. counterpart, giving concrete
shape to U.S.-India cooperation on areas such as
high-energy nuclear physics, nuclear plant design,
construction, operation, safety, life extension and
regulatory oversight.
It is also clear to seasoned observers of India's
nuclear program that there is a danger of India's
nuclear program grinding to a halt in a couple of
decades if India doesn't go in for international
cooperation. India's uranium ore is just adequate for
10,000 MW and India's nuclear weapons program will have
to be accommodated within that. The U.S.-India deal,
therefore, is India's best hope for integrating itself
in the global nuclear framework and drawing its
advantages.
Much to India's chagrin, Iran's nuclear problem has once
again emerged as a complicating factor in India's
efforts to finalize its nuclear deal with the U.S. Iran
decided to remove the seals applied by the I.A.E.A. for
the purpose of verifying the suspension of Iran's P-1
centrifuge uranium enrichment program. It plans to
pursue all its activities to build, research, develop,
and test the P-1 centrifuge. The uranium enrichment
activity is part of a process which could be used both
to generate electricity and to make nuclear weapons. In
response to this, the E.U.-3 (United Kingdom, France and
Germany) along with the U.S. have called for
an
emergency meeting of the I.A.E.A. on February 2 which
will discuss whether to refer Iran to the U.N. Security
Council.
Once again, India has come under pressure as the nature
of its decision at the meeting of the I.A.E.A. Board of
Governors could impact its own nuclear negotiations with
the U.S. In fact, U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford
went public with his warning that if India did not vote
to send Iran to the U.N. Security Council, the effect on
the deal would be "devastating" since the U.S. Congress
would "simply stop considering the matter" and the
initiative will "die." It remains to be seen if the
Indian government decides to repeat its past voting
pattern in the I.A.E.A. or succumbs to domestic pressure
emanating from its coalition partners. Nevertheless, an
open warning from the U.S. may have further muddied the
waters for the Indian government.
Global Reaction to the Deal
To the surprise of many, the nuclear agreement between
India and the U.S. has been successful in garnering some
significant international support. I.A.E.A. Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed India's intention to
identify and place its civilian nuclear facilities under
the I.A.E.A. safeguards and described the pact as a
"concrete and practical step towards the universal
application of I.A.E.A. safeguards." He also made it
clear that making advanced civil nuclear technology
available to all states would contribute to the
enhancement of nuclear safety and security.
While there has not been any official reaction from
Pakistan on the deal, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice made a point of speaking to Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf soon after the deal was
signed and his reaction was described as "constructive."
China's initial reaction was to ignore the deal.
However, when the U.S. demanded lifting the ban on sales
of nuclear technologies to India during a meeting of the
N.S.G. in October 2005, China decided to attack the
U.S.-India nuclear agreement, albeit indirectly. It was
the official media of China that took the lead in the
attack. The People's Daily, China's leading
newspaper, attacked the nuclear deal by arguing that it
will inflict a hard blow to the global non-proliferation
regime. It made it clear that other nuclear suppliers
might imitate the U.S. by helping their own allies in
supplying nuclear technologies. It questioned the motive
behind Washington's decision to reverse its decades-old
policy of preventing India from access to nuclear
technologies.
Soon thereafter, it was reported that China decided to
sell Pakistan six to eight nuclear reactors at the cost
of US$10 billion. It was a not-so-subtle message to the
U.S. that if Washington decides to play favorites, China
also retains the same right. China's action also
conveyed to India that even as India tries hard to break
out of the straitjacket of being a South Asian power
through forging a strategic partnership with the U.S.,
China will do its utmost to contain India by building up
its neighboring adversaries.
Iran also attacked the U.S.-India nuclear deal in an
attempt to counter international pressure on its own
nuclear program. Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali
Larijani, referred to the deal when he argued that the
U.S. enjoys extensive relations with India in the
nuclear field despite India's nuclear weapons program.
He went on to claim that such a "dual standard" was
detrimental to global security.
India, however, quickly countered this argument and
claimed that India has always been in compliance with
its obligations under international treaties and
agreements. India, unlike Iran, is not a signatory to
the N.P.T.; having signed the treaty, Iran must fully
comply with its international commitments in a
transparent manner. [See:
"Intelligence Brief: Iran"]
Meanwhile, however, other important nuclear players seem
to have come on board with regard to the U.S.-India
nuclear deal. Britain, Canada, France, and Russia are
eager to play major roles in future civil nuclear energy
projects in India. As India continues to settle its
problems with the N.S.G., these states hope to
participate and contribute to its program for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. All of these states expect India
to work toward the implementation of the U.S.-India
nuclear accord.
In fact, as late as 2004, despite otherwise excellent
Indo-Russian bilateral relations, Moscow had
categorically ruled out providing enriched uranium to
India for the Tarapur nuclear power plant, citing N.S.G.
rules. It had also refused India's request for an
additional two 1,000 MW reactors for the Koodankulam
nuclear power project. But with the new U.S.-India
nuclear deal, Russia is all set to help India in
acquiring the latest nuclear energy generation
technology. Russia has also decided to move on the lease
of two Akula-class nuclear-propelled submarines which
was blocked because of Russia's unwillingness to annoy
its N.S.G. partners.
American support also led to a decision by the members
of the I.T.E.R. project, including the European Union,
Russia, South Korea, China, and Japan, to include India
as a member.
Conclusion
While there is little hope that the U.S.-India nuclear
agreement will come to fruition before the visit of U.S.
President George W. Bush to India in early March 2006,
it is expected that most of the issues will be sorted
out by then. In India, despite dissenting voices, there
is a wide spectrum of support for the nuclear agreement
with the U.S. This is a development in itself, as,
contrary to past behavior, this reflects a reluctance by
Indian elites to assume an anti-U.S. position by
default.
While the non-proliferation lobby in the U.S. continues
to be the biggest obstacle in the ratification of the
U.S.-India nuclear pact, the Bush administration seems
to be leaving no stone unturned in making sure that the
deal goes through Congress. Nuclear weapon states have
always subordinated their nuclear proliferation
commitments to their strategic interests. The Bush
administration believes that it is in the strategic
interests of the United States for India to emerge as a
major global power, and the administration has made it
clear that it will do its best to help India achieve
that goal.
Dr.
Harsh V. Pant, is Lecturer of Department of
Defence Studies at King's College London. He holds a
doctorate degree from the University of Notre Dame
and a masters degree from Jawaharlal Nehru
University in India. His research interests include
WMD proliferation, U.S. foreign policy, and
Asia-Pacific security issues. His views are his own
and do not necessarily reflect those of King's
College London.
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