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Notes: On 11 June 1964, at the
conclusion of the trial, Mandela and seven others - Walter Sisulu, Govan
Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi, Andrew Mlangeni, Ahmed Kathrada and
Denis Goldberg - were convicted. Mandela was found guilty on four charges of
sabotage and like the others was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Amadelakufa: those who are prepared to make sacrifices.
Saracen armoured vehicles: British-made military troop
carriers.
State witnesses in the trial whose names were withheld for
their protection.
Arthur Goldreich was among those arrested in connection with the Rivonia
case. Later he and three others in custody escaped from jail by bribing a
guard, and fled the country.
Liliesleaf was the name of the farm in the district of
Rivonia on the northern outskirts of Johannesburg where the arrests took
place. At the time it was let to Arthur Goldreich.
The Junior Certificate examination was generally taken by white children at
the age of 15 and they could not normally leave school before this.
Matriculation was taken two years later and qualified students for higher
education. The educational system, however, ensured that very few Africans
reached Junior Certificate level, so that what represented a basic standard
for whites was one of achievement for Africans. Even fewer attained
matriculation level.
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Nelson Mandela's Dock Statement
at the Opening of the Defence case in the Rivonia Trial
Pretoria Supreme Court, 20 April 1964
"..Political division, based on colour,
is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination
of one colour group by another...This then is what the ANC is fighting.
Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African
people, inspired by their own suffering and their own
experience...During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle
of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I
have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a
democratic and free society in which all persons live together in
harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to
live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am
prepared to die..."
I am the First Accused.
I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in
Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a
convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a
permit and for inciting people to go on strike at the end of May 1961.
At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its
opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of
foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did,
both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience
in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because
of what any outsider might have said.
In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling
stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of
wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. The names of
Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe
and Sekhukhuni, were praised as the glory of the entire African nation. I
hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and
make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. This is what has
motivated me in all that I have done in relation to the charges made against
me in this case.
Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length with the
question of violence. Some of the things so far told to the Court are true
and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did
not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of
violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the
political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny,
exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites.
I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form
Umkhonto we Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I
was arrested in August 1962.
In the statement which I am about to make I shall correct certain false
impressions which have been created by State witnesses. Amongst other
things, I will demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the
evidence were not and could not have been committed by Umkhonto. I will also
deal with the relationship between the African National Congress and
Umkhonto, and with the part which I personally have played in the affairs of
both organizations. I shall deal also with the part played by the Communist
Party. In order to explain these matters properly, I will have to explain
what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the
achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chosen. I will also
have to explain how I became involved in the activities of these
organizations.
I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell
outside the policy of the organisation, and which have been charged in the
indictment against us. I do not know what justification there was for these
acts, but to demonstrate that they could not have been authorized by
Umkhonto, I want to refer briefly to the roots and policy of the
organization.
I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form
Umkhonto. I, and the others who started the organization, did so for two
reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy,
violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless
responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our
people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an
intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this
country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that without
violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in
their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of
expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and
we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent
state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law.
We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when
this form was legislated against, and then the Government resorted to a show
of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to
answer violence with violence.
But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed
Umkhonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind
us the ANC tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving
political disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs to all the people
who live in it, and not to one group, be it black or white. We did not want
an interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the Court
is in doubt about this, it will be seen that the whole history of our
organization bears out what I have said, and what I will subsequently say,
when I describe the tactics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I want,
therefore, to say something about the African National Congress.
The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the
African people which had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa Act,
and which were then being threatened by the Native Land Act. For
thirty-seven years - that is until 1949 - it adhered strictly to a
constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent
delegations to the Government in the belief that African grievances could be
settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advance
gradually to full political rights. But White Governments remained unmoved,
and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater. In the
words of my leader, Chief Lutuli, who became President of the ANC in 1952,
and who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:
"who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in
vain, patiently, moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred door? What
have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the
greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress, until today we
have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all".
Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this
time, however, there was a change from the strictly constitutional means of
protest which had been employed in the past. The change was embodied in a
decision which was taken to protest against apartheid legislation by
peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to
this policy the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in
charge of volunteers. This campaign was based on the principles of passive
resistance. More than 8,500 people defied apartheid laws and went to jail.
Yet there was not a single instance of violence in the course of this
campaign on the part of any defier. I and nineteen colleagues were convicted
for the role which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences
were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline and
non-violence had been stressed throughout. This was the time when the
volunteer section of the ANC was established, and when the word
'Amadelakufa' was first used: this was the time when the volunteers were
asked to take a pledge to uphold certain principles.
Evidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced
into this case, but completely out of context. The volunteers were not, and
are not, the soldiers of a black army pledged to fight a civil war against
the whites. They were, and are. dedicated workers who are prepared to lead
campaigns initiated by the ANC to distribute leaflets, to organize strikes,
or do whatever the particular campaign required. They are called volunteers
because they volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping
which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts.
During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law
Amendment Act were passed. These Statutes provided harsher penalties for
offences committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this, the
protests continued and the ANC adhered to its policy of non-violence. In
1956, 156 leading members of the Congress Alliance, including myself, were
arrested on a charge of high treason and charges under the Suppression of
Communism Act. The non-violent policy of the ANC was put in issue by the
State, but when the Court gave judgement some five years later, it found
that the ANC did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted on all
counts, which included a count that the ANC sought to set up a communist
state in place of the existing regime. The Government has always sought to
label all its opponents as communists. This allegation has been repeated in
the present case, but as I will show, the ANC is not, and never has been, a
communist organization.
In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville, which resulted in the
proclamation of a state of emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an
unlawful organization. My colleagues and I, after careful consideration,
decided that we would not obey this decree. The African people were not part
of the Government and did not make the laws by which they were governed. We
believed in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that
'the will of the people shall be the basis of authority of the Government',
and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to accepting the silencing
of the Africans for all time. The ANC refused to dissolve, but instead went
underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization which
had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no
doubt that no self-respecting White political organization would disband
itself if declared illegal by a government in which it had no say.
In 1960 the Government held a referendum which led to the establishment of
the Republic. Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per cent of the
population of South Africa, were not entitled to vote, and were not even
consulted about the proposed constitutional change. All of us were
apprehensive of our future under the proposed White Republic, and a
resolution was taken to hold an All-In African Conference to call for a
National Convention, and to organize mass demonstrations on the eve of the
unwanted Republic, if the Government failed to call the Convention. The
conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was
the Secretary of the conference and undertook to be responsible for
organizing the national stay-at-home which was subsequently called to
coincide with the declaration of the Republic. As all strikes by Africans
are illegal, the person organizing such a strike must avoid arrest. I was
chosen to be this person, and consequently I had to leave my home and family
and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest.
The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC policy, was to be a peaceful
demonstration. Careful instructions were given to organizers and members to
avoid any recourse to violence. The Government's answer was to introduce new
and harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and to send Saracens, armed
vehicles, and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force
designed to intimidate the people. This was an indication that the
Government had decided to rule by force alone, and this decision was a
milestone on the road to Umkhonto.
Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of
it is irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the
attitude eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in
the National Liberation Movement. When I went to jail in 1962, the dominant
idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now know that this was still
so in 1963.
I must return to June 1961. What were we, the leaders of our people, to do?
Were we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against
future action, or were we to fight it and, if so, how?
We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have
been abject surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to
continue the fight. We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial
democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further
apart than they already were. But the hard facts were that fifty years of
non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more
repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for
this Court to understand, but it is a fact that for a long time the people
had been talking of violence - of the day when they would fight the White
man and win back their country - and we, the leaders of the ANC, had
nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue
peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it
could not be denied that our policy to achieve a nonracial State by
non-violence had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to
lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of
terrorism.
It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had, in fact, become a
feature of the South African political scene. There had been violence in
1957 when the women of Zeerust were ordered to carry passes; there was
violence in 1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukhuniland;
there was violence in 1959 when the people of Cato Manor protested against
pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government attempted to
impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in these
disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths, and all this time
the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest.
Each disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans
of the belief that violence was the only way out - it showed that a
Government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to
use force to oppose it. Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas
and were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political struggle.
There now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against
Africans, as well as Whites, if not properly directed. Particularly
disturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as Zeerust,
Sekhukhuniland, and Pondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking
the form, not of struggle against the Government - though this is what
prompted it - but of civil strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a
way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and
bitterness.
At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the
South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that
as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and
wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a
time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.
This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had
failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that
the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and
to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course,
but solely because the Government had left us with no other choice. In the
Manifesto of Umkhonto published on 16 December 1961, which is Exhibit AD, we
said:
"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices
- submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not
submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in
defence of our people, our future, and our freedom".
This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we decided to press for a change
in the policy of the National Liberation Movement. I can only say that I
felt morally obliged to do what I did.
We who had taken this decision started to consult leaders of various
organizations, including the ANC. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what
they said, but I wish to deal with the role of the African National Congress
in this phase of the struggle, and with the policy and objectives of
Umkhonto we Sizwe.
As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a clear view which can be
summarized as follows:
It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil.
Its members had joined on the express policy of non-violence.
Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This
must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the small, closely knit
organization required for sabotage. Nor would this be politically correct,
because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this essential
activity: political propaganda and organization. Nor was it permissible to
change the whole nature of the organization.
On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the ANC
was prepared to depart from its fifty-year-old policy of non-violence to
this extent that it would no longer disapprove of properly controlled
violence. Hence members who undertook such activity would not be subject to
disciplinary action by the ANC.
I say 'properly controlled violence' because I made it clear that if I
formed the organization I would at all times subject it to the political
guidance of the ANC and would not undertake any different form of activity
from that contemplated without the consent of the ANC. And I shall now tell
the Court how that form of violence came to be determined.
As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was formed in November 1961. When we
took this decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the ANC heritage
of non-violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that the
country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would
fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean
the destruction of what the ANC stood for; with civil war, racial peace
would be more difficult than ever to achieve. We already have examples in
South African history of the results of war. It has taken more than fifty
years for the scars of the South African War to disappear. How much longer
would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which could
not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides?
The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but
when we decided to adopt violence as part of our policy, we realized that we
might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken
into account in formulating our plans. We required a plan which was flexible
and which permitted us to act in accordance with the needs of the times;
above all, the plan had to be one which recognized civil war as the last
resort, and left the decision on this question to the future. We did not
want to be committed to civil war, but we wanted to be ready if it became
inevitable.
Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla
warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt
the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision.
In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one.
Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for
future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the
policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is
what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit
AD):
"We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation
without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that
our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the
disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope
that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses
before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can
be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war."
The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and
economic situation of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to
a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned
destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone
communications, would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it
more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on
schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of
the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their
position.
Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be linked with
sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These
attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition,
they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption
of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our
followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against
Government violence.
In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals
taken, we felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other
countries, and that greater pressure would be brought to bear on the South
African Government.
This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sabotage, and strict
instructions were given to its members right from the start, that on no
account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out
operations. These instructions have been referred to in the evidence of 'Mr.
X' and 'Mr. Z'.
The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and directed by a National High
Command, which had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint
Regional Commands. The High Command was the body which determined tactics
and targets and was in charge of training and finance. Under the High
Command there were Regional Commands which were responsible for the
direction of the local sabotage groups. Within the framework of the policy
laid down by the National High Command, the Regional Commands had authority
to select the targets to be attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the
prescribed framework and thus had no authority to embark upon acts which
endangered life, or which did not fit into the overall plan of sabotage. For
instance, Umkhonto members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation.
Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regional Command were an
importation from the Jewish national underground organization Irgun Zvai
Leumi, which operated in Israel between 1944 and 1948.
Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 December 1961, when Government
buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The
selection of targets is proof of the policy to which I have referred. Had we
intended to attack life we would have selected targets where people
congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. The sabotage which
was committed before 16 December 1961 was the work of isolated groups and
had no connection whatever with Umkhonto. In fact, some of these and a
number of later acts were claimed by other organizations.
The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the day that operations commenced.
The response to our actions and Manifesto among the white population was
characteristically violent. The Government threatened to take strong action,
and called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of
the Africans. The Whites failed to respond by suggesting change; they
responded to our call by suggesting the laager.
In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly
there was hope again. Things were happening. People in the townships became
eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the
initial successes, and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would
be obtained.
But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response with anxiety. The lines
were being drawn. The whites and blacks were moving into separate camps, and
the prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. The white newspapers
carried reports that sabotage would be punished by death. If this was so,
how could we continue to keep Africans away from terrorism?
Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In 1920
when the famous leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth jail,
twenty-four of a group of Africans who had gathered to demand his release
were killed by the police and white civilians. In 1921, more than one
hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair. In 1924 over two hundred
Africans were killed when the Administrator of South-West Africa led a force
against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On 1
May 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the
strike. On 21 March 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville.
How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And
how many more Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and
terror becoming the order of the day? And what would happen to our people
when that stage was reached? In the long run we felt certain we must
succeed, but at what cost to ourselves and the rest of the country? And if
this happened, how could black and white ever live together again in peace
and harmony? These were the problems that faced us, and these were our
decisions.
Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless
opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was
precisely because the soil of South Africa is already drenched with the
blood of innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to make preparations as
a long-term undertaking to use force in order to defend ourselves against
force. If war were inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms
most favourable to our people. The fight which held out prospects best for
us and the least risk of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. We
decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make provision
for the possibility of guerrilla warfare.
All whites undergo compulsory military training, but no such training was
given to Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of
trained men who would be able to provide the leadership which would be
required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a
situation before it became too late to make proper preparations. It was also
necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and
other professions, so that Africans would be equipped to participate in the
government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so.
At this stage it was decided that I should attend the Conference of the
Pan-African Freedom Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa, which
was to be held early in 1962 in Addis Ababa, and, because of our need for
preparation, it was also decided that, after the conference, I would
undertake a tour of the African States with a view to obtaining facilities
for the training of soldiers, and that I would also solicit scholarships for
the higher education of matriculated Africans. Training in both fields would
be necessary, even if changes came about by peaceful means. Administrators
would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non-racial
State and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force of
such a State.
It was on this note that I left South Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a
delegate of the ANC. My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sympathy
for our cause and promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand
of White South Africa, and even in London I was received with great sympathy
by political leaders, such as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was
promised support by such men as Julius Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika;
Mr. Kawawa, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia; General Abboud, President of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President
of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria; Modibo Keita, President of
Mali; Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou Toure, President of
Guinea; President Tubman of Liberia; and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of
Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujda, the Headquarters of
the Algerian Army of National Liberation, the visit which is described in my
diary, one of the Exhibits.
I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst
abroad, underwent a course in military training. If there was to be
guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand and fight with my people and
to share the hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures which I received in
Algeria are contained in Exhibit 16, produced in evidence.
Summaries of books on guerrilla warfare and military strategy have also
been produced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my
writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the
role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla
warfare. I approached this question as every African Nationalist should do.
I was completely objective.
The Court will see that I attempted to examine all types of authority
on the subject - from the East and from the West, going back to the
classic work of
Clausewitz, and covering such a variety as
Mao Tse Tung
and
Che Guevara on the one hand, and the writings on the
Anglo-Boer
War on the other. Of course, these notes are merely summaries of the
books I read and do not contain my personal views.
I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training.
But here it was impossible to organize any scheme without the co-operation
of the ANC offices in Africa. I consequently obtained the permission of the
ANC in South Africa to do this. To this extent then there was a departure
from the original decision of the ANC, but it applied outside South Africa
only. The first batch of recruits actually arrived in Tanganyika when I was
passing through that country on my way back to South Africa.
I returned to South Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of
my trip. On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the
political scene save that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now
become a fact. The attitude of my colleagues in Umkhonto was much the same
as it had been before I left. They were feeling their way cautiously and
felt that it would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotage were
exhausted. In fact, the view was expressed by some that the training of
recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the document which is
Exhibit R.14. After a full discussion, however, it was decided to go ahead
with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take
many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a
guerrilla campaign, and whatever happened the training would be of value.
I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the
State. But before doing so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by
witnesses to have happened in Port Elizabeth and East London. I am referring
to the bombing of private houses of pro-Government persons during September,
October and November 1962. I do not know what justification there was for
these acts, nor what provocation had been given. But if what I have said
already is accepted, then it is clear that these acts had nothing to do with
the carrying out of the policy of Umkhonto.
One of the chief allegations in the indictment is that the ANC was a party
to a general conspiracy to commit sabotage. I have already explained why
this is incorrect but how, externally, there was a departure from the
original principle laid down by the ANC.
There has, of course, been overlapping of functions internally as well,
because there is a difference between a resolution adopted in the atmosphere
of a committee room and the concrete difficulties that arise in the field of
practical activity. At a later stage the position was further affected by
bannings and house arrests, and by persons leaving the country to take up
political work abroad. This led to individuals having to do work in
different capacities. But though this may have blurred the distinction
between Umkhonto and the ANC, it by no means abolished that distinction.
Great care was taken to keep the activities of the two organizations in
South Africa distinct.
The ANC remained a mass political body of Africans only carrying on the
type of political work they had conducted prior to 1961. Umkhonto remained a
small organization recruiting its members from different races and
organizations and trying to achieve its own particular object. The fact that
members of Umkhonto were recruited from the ANC, and the fact that persons
served both organizations, like Solomon Mbanjwa, did not, in our view,
change the nature of the ANC or give it a policy of violence. This
overlapping of officers, however, was more the exception than the rule. This
is why persons such as 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z', who were on the Regional Command
of their respective areas, did not participate in any of the ANC committees
or activities, and why people such as Mr. Bennett Mashiyana and Mr. Reginald
Ndubi did not hear of sabotage at their ANC meetings.
Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the
headquarters of Umkhonto. This is not true of the time when I was there. I
was told, of course, and knew that certain of the activities of the
Communist Party were carried on there. But this is no reason (as I shall
presently explain) why I should not use the place.
I came there in the following manner:
As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went underground to organize the
May general strike. My work entailed travelling throughout the country,
living now in African townships, then in country villages and again in
cities.
During the second half of the year I started visiting the Parktown home of
Arthur Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had
no direct political association with him, I had known Arthur Goldreich
socially since 1958.
In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he was moving out of town and
offered me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged for
Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I naturally found Rivonia an ideal
place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up to that time I had
been compelled to live indoors during the daytime and could only venture out
under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf [farm, Rivonia,] I could live
differently and work far more efficiently.
For obvious reasons, I had to disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious
name of David. In December, Arthur Goldreich and his family moved in. I
stayed there until I went abroad on 11 January 1962. As already indicated, I
returned in July 1962 and was arrested in Natal on 5 August.
Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of
neither the African National Congress nor Umkhonto. With the exception of
myself, none of the officials or members of these bodies lived there, no
meetings of the governing bodies were ever held there, and no activities
connected with them were either organized or directed from there. On
numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf farm I met both the
Executive Committee of the ANC, as well as the NHC, but such meetings were
held elsewhere and not on the farm.
Whilst staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldreich
in the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. We had numerous
political discussions covering a variety of subjects. We discussed
ideological and practical questions, the Congress Alliance, Umkhonto and its
activities generally, and his experiences as a soldier in the Palmach, the
military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority of the
Jewish National Movement in Palestine.
Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich, I recommended on my return
to South Africa that he should be recruited to Umkhonto. I do not know of my
personal knowledge whether this was done.
Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects
of the ANC and the Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this
and with my own political position, because I must assume that the State may
try to argue from certain Exhibits that I tried to introduce Marxism into
the ANC. The allegation as to the ANC is false. This is an old allegation
which was disproved at the Treason Trial and which has again reared its
head. But since the allegation has been made again, I shall deal with it as
well as with the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party and
Umkhonto and that party.
The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of
African Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed
in the cry, 'Drive the White man into the sea'. The African Nationalism for
which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the
African people in their own land. The most important political document ever
adopted by the ANC is the 'Freedom Charter'. It is by no means a blueprint
for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalization,
of land; it provides for nationalization of mines, banks, and monopoly
industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without
such nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the
spread of political power.
It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against
Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this
respect the ANC's policy corresponds with the old policy of the present
Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the
nationalization of the gold mines which, at that time, were controlled by
foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter, nationalization would take place
in an economy based on private enterprise. The realization of the Freedom
Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of
all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at any period of
its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of
the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned
capitalist society.
As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy
correctly, it stands for the establishment of a State based on the
principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom
Charter, as a short term solution to the problems created by white
supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end,
of its programme.
The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its
chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full
political rights. The Communist Party's main aim, on the other hand, was to
remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government.
The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC
seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital distinction.
It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and
the Communist Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal - in
this case the removal of white supremacy - and is not proof of a complete
community of interests.
The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most
striking illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great
Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union in the fight
against Hitler. Nobody but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such
co-operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into communists or communist
tools, or that Britain and America were working to bring about a communist
world.
Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkhonto.
Shortly after Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some of its
members that the Communist Party would support Umkhonto, and this then
occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly.
I believe that communists have always played an active role in the fight by
colonial countries for their freedom, because the short-term objects of
communism would always correspond with the long-term objects of freedom
movements. Thus communists have played an important role in the freedom
struggles fought in countries such as Malaya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet
none of these States today are communist countries. Similarly in the
underground resistance movements which sprung up in Europe during the last
World War, communists played an important role. Even General Chiang
Kai-Shek, today one of the bitterest enemies of communism, fought together
with the communists against the ruling class in the struggle which led to
his assumption of power in China in the 1930s.
This pattern of co-operation between communists and non-communists has been
repeated in the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the
banning of the Communist Party, joint campaigns involving the Communist
Party and the Congress movements were accepted practice. African communists
could, and did, become members of the ANC, and some served on the National,
Provincial, and local committees. Amongst those who served on the National
Executive are Albert Nzula, a former Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses
Kotane, another former Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a former member of the
Central Committee.
I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the
policy of admitting communists to the ANC, and the close co-operation which
existed at times on specific issues between the ANC and the Communist Party,
would lead to a watering down of the concept of African Nationalism.
At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress Youth
League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of communists
from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted
against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African
political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its
inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one
school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people,
accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the
common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point
of view and I have upheld it ever since.
It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained
prejudice against communism, to understand why experienced African
politicians so readily accept communists as their friends. But to us the
reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against
oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for
many decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who
were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were
prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and work with us. They
were the only political group which was prepared to work with the Africans
for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society.
Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to equate
freedom with communism. They are supported in this belief by a legislature
which brands all exponents of democratic government and African freedom as
communists and bans many of them (who are not communists) under the
Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have never been a member of the
Communist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because
of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned and
imprisoned under that Act.
It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst
those who support our cause. In the international field, communist countries
have always come to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the
world the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against
colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some
of the Western powers. Although there is a universal condemnation of
apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than
most of the white world. In these circumstances, it would take a brash young
politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the Communists are our
enemies.
I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist, and I
think that in the circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what my
political beliefs are.
I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot.
After all, I was born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my
cousin, who was the acting paramount chief of Tembuland, and I am related
both to the present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata Dalindyebo, and to
Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei.
Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which
springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the
structure and organization of early African societies in this country. The
land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were
no rich or poor and there was no exploitation.
It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist
thought. But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent
States. Such widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser
all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some form of socialism
to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world
and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we
are Marxists.
Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is open to debate whether the
Communist Party has any specific role to play at this particular stage of
our political struggle. The basic task at the present moment is the removal
of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis
of the Freedom Charter. In so far as that Party furthers this task, I
welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one of the means by which
people of all races can be drawn into our struggle.
From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists,
I have gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system
of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an
admirer of such a system.
The
Magna Carta, the
Petition of Rights, and the
Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats
throughout the world.
I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the
country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most
democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality
of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.
The American Congress, that country's doctrine of separation of powers, as
well as the independence of its judiciary, arouses in me similar sentiments.
I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has
led me to feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be
absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular
system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to
borrow the best from the West and from the East . . .
There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support
from abroad, and I wish to deal with this question.
Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources - from
funds raised by our own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a
special campaign or an important political case - for example, the Treason
Trial - we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and
organizations in the Western countries. We had never felt it necessary to go
beyond these sources.
But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a
new phase of struggle introduced, we realized that these events would make a
heavy call on our slender resources, and that the scale of our activities
would be hampered by the lack of funds. One of my instructions, as I went
abroad in January 1962, was to raise funds from the African states.
I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political
movements in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them, in
areas which had still not attained independence, had received all forms of
assistance from the socialist countries, as well as from the West, including
that of financial support. I also discovered that some well-known African
states, all of them non-communists, and even anti-communists, had received
similar assistance.
On my return to the Republic, I made a strong recommendation to the ANC that
we should not confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countries, but
that we should also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the
funds which we so urgently needed.
I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I
am not prepared to name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty
to disclose the names of the organizations and countries which gave us
support or promised to do so.
As I understand the State case, and in particular the evidence of 'Mr. X',
the suggestion is that Umkhonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party
which sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enrol the African
people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom, but
in reality was fighting for a communist state. Nothing could be further from
the truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by
Africans to further their struggle for freedom in their own land. Communists
and others supported the movement, and we only wish that more sections of
the community would join us.
Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships or, to use the
language of the State Prosecutor, 'so-called hardships'. Basically, we fight
against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa
and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have repealed.
These features are poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need
communists or so-called 'agitators' to teach us about these things.
South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the
richest countries in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable
contrasts. The whites enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living
in the world, whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per cent of
the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded and, in some cases,
drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion and the overworking of the
soil makes it impossible for them to live properly off the land. Thirty per
cent are labourers, labour tenants, and squatters on white farms and work
and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages.
The other 30 per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and
social habits which bring them closer in many respects to white standards.
Yet most Africans, even in this group, are impoverished by low incomes and
high cost of living.
The highest-paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in
Johannesburg. Yet their actual position is desperate. The latest figures
were given on 25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg
Non-European Affairs Department. The poverty datum line for the average
African family in Johannesburg (according to Mr. Carr's department) is
R42.84 per month. He showed that the average monthly wage is R32.24 and that
46 per cent of all African families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to
keep them going.
Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of
malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans.
Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastro-enteritis, and scurvy bring
death and destruction of health. The incidence of infant mortality is one of
the highest in the world. According to the Medical Officer of Health for
Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day (almost all Africans), and
in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported. These diseases not only
destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded mental
conditions and lack of initiative, and reduce powers of concentration. The
secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the
standard of work performed by African labourers.
The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the
whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed
to preserve this situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The
first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a
greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are
concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by
legislation.
The present Government has always sought to hamper Africans in their search
for education. One of their early acts, after coming into power, was to stop
subsidies for African school feeding. Many African children who attended
schools depended on this supplement to their diet. This was a cruel act.
There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to
their parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for
the African children, though there are some who receive such assistance.
African children, however, generally have to pay more for their schooling
than whites. According to figures quoted by the South African Institute of
Race Relations in its 1963 journal, approximately 40 per cent of African
children in the age group between seven to fourteen do not attend school.
For those who do attend school, the standards are vastly different from
those afforded to white children. In 1960-61 the per capita Government
spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimated at R12.46.
In the same years, the per capita spending on white children in the Cape
Province (which are the only figures available to me) was R144.57. Although
there are no figures available to me, it can be stated, without doubt, that
the white children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from
wealthier homes than African children on whom R12.46 per head was being
spent.
The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu
Educational Journal, only 5,660 African children in the whole of South
Africa passed their Junior Certificate in 1962, and in that year only 362
passed matric. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu
education about which the present Prime Minister said, during the debate on
the
Bantu Education Bill in 1953:
"When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives
will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not
for them . . . People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for
Natives. When my Department controls Native education it will know for what
class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a
chance in life to use his knowledge."
The other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the
industrial colour-bar under which all the better jobs of industry are
reserved for Whites only. Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the
unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are open to them are not
allowed to form trade unions which have recognition under the Industrial
Conciliation Act.
This means that strikes of African workers are illegal, and that they are
denied the right of collective bargaining which is permitted to the
better-paid White workers. The discrimination in the policy of successive
South African Governments towards African workers is demonstrated by the
so-called 'civilized labour policy' under which sheltered, unskilled
Government jobs are found for those white workers who cannot make the grade
in industry, at wages which far exceed the earnings of the average African
employee in industry.
The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South
Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other
countries in Africa. I do not know whether this statement is true and doubt
whether any comparison can be made without having regard to the
cost-of-living index in such countries. But even if it is true, as far as
the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is not that
we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are
poor by comparison with the white people in our own country, and that we are
prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance.
The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of
the policy of white supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferiority.
Legislation designed to preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion.
Menial tasks in South Africa are invariably performed by Africans. When
anything has to be carried or cleaned the white man will look around for an
African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not.
Because of this sort of attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a
separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their
own; they do not realize that they have emotions - that they fall in love
like white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children
like white people want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough
money to support their families properly, to feed and clothe them and send
them to school. And what 'house-boy' or 'garden-boy' or labourer can ever
hope to do this?
Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of
legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to police
surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in
South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his
pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into jail each year
under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep
husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life.
Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children
wander about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go
to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see
that they go to school, because both parents (if there be two) have to work
to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to
an alarming rise in illegitimacy, and to growing violence which erupts not
only politically, but everywhere. Life in the townships is dangerous. There
is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And
violence is carried out of the townships in the white living areas. People
are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and
robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now
be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering
sore.
Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which
they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them
to be capable o Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work,
and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there.
Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they work, and not
to be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own.
Africans want to be part of the general population, and not confined to
living in their own ghettoes. African men want to have their wives and
children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an
unnatural existence in men's hostels. African women want to be with their
menfolk and not be left permanently widowed in the Reserves. Africans want
to be allowed out after eleven o'clock at night and not to be confined to
their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel in
their own country and to seek work where they want to and not where the
Labour Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of
South Africa; they want security and a stake in society.
Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our
disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the
whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans.
This makes the white man fear democracy.
But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution
which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that
the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political
division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears,
so will the domination of one colour group by another. The ANC has spent
half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not
change that policy.
This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national
one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering
and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live.
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African
people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against
black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free
society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal
opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But
if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.
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