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LTTE's Military Victories &
International Response: 1997 - 2000 |
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17 December
1999 |
Paranthan falls to LTTE
"Paranthan army camp, situated strategically on the southern sector of
Elephant Pass base complex, has fallen to the LTTE fighters today after intense fighting
that lasted more than 24 hours. Paranthan junction and its surrounding areas are now under
the control of the LTTE fighters..."
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25 January 2000 |
What's the
Solution - Nadesan Satyendra
"...In the end, a solution to the Tamil Eelam - Sri Lanka conflict will have
to be found by looking behind the stated positions of the parties to the conflict and
trying to clarify and understand the interests that each party seeks to
protect. There is a need to genuinely understand these interests. There
may be a need to refine, and build on, the approaches spelt out in
Sri Lanka-Tamil Eelam: Getting to Yes..."
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28 March 2000 |
Institute
of Commonwealth Studies - Workshop on Peace Process
"In comparison to consecutive Sri Lankan governments,
the LTTE have consistently had a better grasp of political and military
realities.. the government's analysis is frequently
based on hearsay, telling powerful people what they want to hear..."
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22 April 2000 |
Elephant Pass Falls to LTTE
"Yakachchi and Elephant Pass bases forming the giant
military complex of the Sri Lankan army on the gateway to Jaffna fell to the combat
formations of the Liberation Tigers this afternoon following 48 hours of fierce and bloody
fighting. Over one thousand Sri Lankan troops were killed and the rest fled in total
disarray..."
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11 May 2000 |
LTTE scores spectacular
military gains
"..The combat units of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) achieved
spectacular military gains in the battle of Jaffna today when they advanced close to the
city centre in the Jaffna municipal area and overran two major military bases in the
Chavakachcheri sector..."
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21 May 2000 |
India ready to take any
step that is necessary in Sri Lanka says Indian Prime Minister
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| 22 May 2000 |
Eelam will not harm India says LTTE Spokesman in London |
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24 May 2000 |
India has offered to play the role of broker says Minister Kadirgamar |
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31 May 2000 |
India will not broker
ceasefire says Indian Statesman |
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31 May 2000 |
India happy to let Norway deal with LTTE confirms Indian Express |
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1 June 2000 |
US based Centre for Strategic &
International Studies on LTTE's 'Dramatic Advance to Gates of Jaffna'
"The
dramatic advance of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) into the
Jaffna peninsula, the heart of the Tamil area, is a shattering blow for
Sri Lanka's President Chandrika Kumaratunga and raises concerns of
regional instability for India. The immediate danger is massive
bloodshed, with upwards of 25,000 Sri Lankan troops still in Jaffna city
....In the longer term, the prospects for Sri Lanka's fragile peace
efforts
have been badly undercut. Reviving them will require a much more
radical approach to power sharing than the government has been willing
to consider in the past. This will be very hard to sell to both the
Sinhalese political mainstream and the LTTE, but it will only get harder
with time....
A loose confederal structure, with some kind of explicit recognition of the Tamils as a
collective group within it and with stronger guarantees of their inclusion in power at the
national level, might be more successful. Two draft Canadian constitutions proposed that
certain legislative changes would require a "double majority" of both English
and French-speaking parliamentarians; an analogous provision might be useful. Obviously,
this type of radical departure would be intensely controversial in the Sri Lankan
political mainstream. But half measures will only prolong the country's agony..."
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2 June 2000 |
US
think tank moots confederal Sri Lanka says Deccan Herald |
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3 June 2000 |
US
Confederation move divides Sri Lanka claims Hindustan Times |
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15 June 2000 |
World Bank
Report - Sri Lanka: Recapturing Missed Opportunities
"The conflict has reduced Sri Lankas economic growth and the most obvious direct
cost is in terms of defence expenditures, which increased from 1.3% of GDP in 1980 to 4-6%
over recent years. Some of the other direct costs are government expenditures on relief,
damaged infrastructure and military expenditure by the LTTE. ...Sri Lanka’s future economic and social
development will depend not merely on maintaining sound macroeconomic
management, but more importantly on the country’s ability to resolve the
continuing conflict..."
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31 July 2000 |
Karunanithi
suggests Czechoslovakian Model to end conflict - Victor Rajakulendran |
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1 September 2000 |
US Congressman Brad Sherman
to US Secretary of State
"The United States has an opportunity make
Sri Lanka a model and help it to evolve, by negotiating,
two autonomous democratic
political structures within a system acceptable to both parties, where ethnic
communities can coexist peacefully on the Island. The US should be firm in its message to
the government and the opposition, that if negotiations are not forthcoming immediately,
they should be prepared to conduct a referendum of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.This can be done with the assistance of the United Nations similar to the
referendum in East Timor. Thus, in
the absence of a negotiated settlement, the Tamil people could determine whether they want
a confederation or
a separate state as
endorsed by the Tamil people in the last democratic elections held in 1977 in the
north and east of Sri Lanka..."
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October 2000 |
Sri
Lanka’s Long War - Miriam Young
"..Unless consistent pressure is brought to bear on
both the LTTE and the government, they are unlikely to make serious
efforts to change. Although the parties cannot be forced to the
negotiating table, points of leverage need to be considered.
One
point of leverage is aid, an option donor countries have been
unwilling to use in the past but which bears another look, given that
the Sri Lankan government is now channeling a much higher proportion of
its resources into the war. At the same time, it would be helpful for
the U.S. to find a way to open a channel of communication with the LTTE,
as it has done with other guerrilla groups in the past. The willingness
of many countries to concur with the Sri Lankan government’s
demonization of the LTTE will not lead to an environment conducive to
negotiations, and Washington should avoid such a one-sided approach..."
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1 November 2000 |
LTTE
leader meets Norwegian Peace Envoy |
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November 2000 |
Raymond Johansen, Norwegian Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr.V.Pirabhakaran, Leader of LTTE
with proposal for Memorandum of Understanding |
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23 November 2000 |
The
British Devolution Experience - Peter Hain, UK Minister of State, Foreign
Affairs
"This is a war neither side can win
militarily. It is a conflict that cannot be resolved without elected leaders
being prepared to sit down with people who may well be responsible for barbarous
assassinations, but
who do have a legitimate
political programme which needs to be engaged, not shunned. It took far too
long for us to learn that lesson in Britain, and far too many lives were lost as
a consequence. Equally, the LTTE, like the IRA, need to acknowledge that, whilst a Tamil
Kingdom constitutionally split from the rest of the island will not receive
recognition by Europe, the USA or indeed India, the principle of self
determination and control over most if not all the key policies affecting daily
life would be supported by the international community. There is no future for a
Sri Lanka paralysed by dogma, intransigence and cruelty. Compromises, difficult
decisions and tough choices will be needed, some painful..."
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