Norwegian Peace Initiative
Sri Lanka Peace Process: Problems & Prospects
Jayantha Dhanapala,
Secretary General, Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process
& Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka
Speech to Asia Society, Washington DC, 12 September 2005
Over nine years ago, I had the pleasure of addressing
the Asia Society’s Washington Centre as my country’s Ambassador to the
USA. The subject of my presentation then was the conflict in Sri Lanka
and the steps that were being taken to negotiate a solution notably
through the 1995 Constitutional
proposals.
Comment: It may have been
helpful if Mr.Dhanapala had made clear the approch adopted by President
Kumaratunga in 1995/6. On 3 August 1995, Sri Lanka President
Kumaratunga released a 'Devolution' package with the stated objective of ending the
ethnic conflict in the island. At the same time she re affirmed her intention to wage war against the Liberation
Tigers and launched a genocidal attack on the Tamil homeland
in the north of the island of Sri Lanka. She
promised the
Buddhist High Priests in Kandy that the 'Devolution' package will not be finalised
until the 'war is won'. She added that the
package will
not 'erode the powers of the centre' and declared that there would be no merger of the
North and East'. It was later announced that the 'Devolution' package
would be further watered down.
While those and subsequent steps have not been
successful, my themes were that the presence of
disaffected minorities
in democracies was
not a basis for secession and that violence and terrorism are
inadmissible as a means of redressing grievances under any
circumstances. Those themes remain valid.
Comment: Mr Dhanapala may want to re
examine the validity of these themes in the light of observations such as
those made by the
UNESCO International Conference of Experts in
Barcelona in 1998 "...In all regions of the
world conflicts turn violent over the desire for full control by state
governments, on the one hand, and claims to
self-determination (in a broad sense) by peoples, minorities or other
communities, on the other. Where governments recognise and respect the right
to self-determination, a people can effectuate it in a peaceful manner.
Where governments
choose to use force to crush or prevent the movement, or where they
attempt to
impose assimilationist policies against the wishes of a people, this
polarises demands and generally
results in armed conflict. The Tamils, for example, were not seeking
independence and were not using violence in the 1970s. The government
response to further deny the Tamil
people equal expression of their distinct identity led to armed
confrontation and a war of secession..."
Since my last address here the quest for peace in Sri Lanka has gone on
despite changes in government through
democratic elections.
Comment: Over the years, democracy in
Sri Lanka has acquired a special flavour. In 1986, Senator A.L.Missen, then Chairman of the Australian
Parliamentary Group of Amnesty International, declared in the Australian Senate: "....The democracy of Sri Lanka
has been described in the
following terms, terms which are a fair and accurate description: 'The reluctance to
hold general elections, the muzzling of the opposition press, the continued reliance on
extraordinary powers unknown to a free democracy, arbitrary detention without access to
lawyers or relations, torture of detainees on a systematic basis, the intimidation of the
judiciary by the executive, the disenfranchisement of the opposition, an executive
President who holds undated letters of resignation from members of the legislature, an
elected President who publicly declares his lack of care for the lives or opinion of a
section of his electorate, and the continued subjugation of the Tamil people by a
permanent Sinhala majority, within the confines of an unitary constitutional frame,
constitute the reality of 'democracy', Sri Lankan style.'"
(Australian Senate
Hansard, 13 March 1986)
Since then not much has changed. "The people of Sri Lanka
can no longer
hope for the peaceful exercise of their right to freely elect their representatives at
national, or even local, elections...The concept of free and fair elections has become an
illusion in Sri Lanka..."
Lost Dream of Free and Fair Elections
-
Asian Human Rights Commission,
1999
Each chapter
of the peace process has contributed its lessons both positive and
negative. No peace process can succeed unless both parties to the
conflict genuinely want success.
For a non-state organization like the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - built as a war machine with
single minded aims of secession, one party dictatorship, and racial exclusivism- the transition into adopting a non-violent political
approach, the give and take of negotiations and abiding by the global
norms of democracy and human rights has been very difficult.
Comment: "...One of the essential elements that
must
be kept in mind in understanding the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is that,
since 1958 at least, every time Tamil politicians negotiated some sort of
power-sharing deal with a Sinhalese government - regardless of which party
was in power - the opposition Sinhalese party always claimed that the party
in power had negotiated away too much. In almost every case - sometimes
within days - the party in power backed down on the agreement..."
Professor Marshall Singer to the
US Congress Committee on International Relations
,1995
Peace has
to be built on a foundation of
democracy,
human rights, development and
disarmament with the human security and legitimate aspirations of all
citizens assured if it is to be durable.
Before I focus on the problems and prospects and in order to clear the
unique “fog of peace” in Sri Lanka, let me give you a brief background
to the current phase of the peace process. The genesis of this phase is
in a ceasefire agreement which was
brokered by Norway and signed by the Government of Sri Lanka and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February 2002.
Direct talks between the government and LTTE with Norwegian facilitation
began in September 2002. Six rounds of
negotiations were held with a thematic focus on political issues,
humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development of the North and the
East, military issues of normalization and de-escalation, human rights,
gender issues, and children in armed conflict.
Full implementation of
the decisions made on these themes have not been possible due to the
fact that talks between the two parties have been stalled since April
2003, when the LTTE unilaterally walked away from the negotiating table.
Comment:
"..In our view,
resolution of the Sinhalese political party struggle is the top
priority. This
conflict—whatever the merits of the arguments—is selfish in the short-term
and self defeating
in the long-term. The country is ready for peace. The LTTE is ready to
continue negotiations. The world cannot understand why Sri Lanka does not
move ahead
to peace. All parties need to seize this moment, honor their constituents’
faith in them,
and settle their dispute immediately. The critical next steps we explore in
this report will
go unaddressed if this issue is not resolved immediately."...Securing Peace: An Action Strategy for Sri Lanka
- A Report Prepared by Princeton
University
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2004
The peace process in Sri Lanka at present can therefore best be
characterized as a ‘no war, no peace’ situation with the whole weight of
the peace process being carried on the shoulders of the CFA. The CFA is
itself under enormous strain due to almost daily violations by the LTTE
which, at the end of August this year had reached a total of 3113 as
against 141 by the government according to the independent rulings of
the Nordic ceasefire monitors.
The assassination of Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar, the
Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka on 12 August this year was the most
egregious of such LTTE violations. Acts such as these have led to the
collapse of peace processes in some other countries. Despite this grave
provocation, the GOSL will continue to strictly adhere to and respect
the CFA while seeking to improve its implementation.
Because of the systematic violations of several provisions of the
Ceasefire, and especially the LTTE’s refusal to hold problem-solving
talks in conflict zones between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and
LTTE area leaders (Article 3.11), the Government has been, for quite
sometime, asking for a review of the implementation of the CFA.
This has been resisted by the LTTE, until now. But, in
the face of the outrage expressed by the international community over
the Kadirgamar assassination, the LTTE agreed to these talks with
remarkable speed. However, negotiations on a venue for these talks have
proved inconclusive.
The GOSL has maintained that it wants the meeting to be
held in Sri Lanka in consideration of the nature of the talks, while the
LTTE wanted a venue outside Sri Lanka or in Killinochchi, which is in
the LTTE dominated area.
The Norwegians in their most recent effort to find a
compromise solution suggested the International Airport as a venue, on
the basis that if the LTTE is prepared to travel abroad for a meeting,
then they have to be ready to pass through the same airport. The GOSL
accepted this proposal, but the LTTE has rejected it. The GOSL is,
therefore, compelled to come to the conclusion that the LTTE was not
sincere when they readily agreed to hold these talks.
Comment: At the time that Mr.Dhanapala
addressed the Sri Lanka Caucus on 8 September 2005, it may be possible that
he was unaware of the agreement signed by his
Prime Minister and SLFP Presidential Nominee with the JVP on the same date,
the same cannot be said four days later. That Mr.Dhanapala failed to inform
the stand of his Prime Minister and Presidential nominee that the 'unitary nature of the Sri Lankan State'would
be secured 'under any solutions to be presented, formed or formulated for
the purpose of the resolution of Sri Lanka's national question' raises
questions about Mr.Dhanapala's transparency.
Going beyond a review of the implementation of the CFA, the GOSL is also
concerned about the qualitative nature of CFA violations committed by
the LTTE and the lack of provision for targeted sanctions against
violations. Most violations of the CFA by the LTTE fall into the
category of human rights violations such as child recruitment, political
killings, abductions, torture, extortions and harassment.
The LTTE has recruited and used children as soldiers throughout the
conflict in Sri Lanka and especially since 1987. In 2003, the GOSL and
the LTTE formally agreed to an Action Plan for Children Affected by War
that included a pledge by the LTTE to end all recruitment of children.
This was in fact the only signed agreement to result from the peace
talks.
After initially releasing a handful of children, they
appear to have abandoned the Action Plan altogether. Indeed UNICEF under
whose aegis the Action Plan was developed and signed, has documented a
significant increase in under-age recruitment in recent months. As of 31
July 2005, the total under-age recruitment cases known to UNICEF was
5081 children. Of these, 1209 children are continuing to be used as
child combatants by the LTTE at present.
In this context the government welcomes the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1612 of July 26, 2005 on protection of children in
armed conflict. The Resolution calls for “targeted and graduated
measures” to be imposed on parties that are in violation of
international law relating to the rights and protection of children in
armed conflict. The LTTE is named as an Offending Party under the
Resolution, for its continued recruitment and forcible abduction of
children into its fighting forces.
The LTTE’s lack of tolerance for political dissent, which made it one of
the most feared terrorist organizations in the world prior to the
ceasefire, has also not undergone any change in the post CFA period.
Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE in his first media
conference following the CFA, when questioned whether the LTTE would
allow other political groups to operate in the North and the East stated
that ‘We can assure you that other political parties, whatever their
policies may be - will be allowed to function in the north and east’. It
is a promise that he has not kept.
Despite these assurances systematic killings,
abductions, and torture of opponents and even inadvertent dissidents
have continued posing a serious threat to the CFA.
These violations continue with impunity, as the success of the CFA
depends on good faith of both parties, and on a naming and shaming
concept which does not work well with the LTTE. Given these gaps in the
CFA, there is now a growing consensus on the need for a separate human
rights agreement to supplement the CFA.
This preoccupation with the CFA and its limitations has also diverted
attention from the core issues that underpin the conflict. The lack of
direct face-to-face peace negotiations since April 2003 has meant that
it has not been possible to make any progress on the substantive core
issues of the conflict, three years after the CFA, despite the best
efforts of the Government. Dialogue is vital for a peace process to move
forward.
The problem has been in relation to developing an agenda acceptable to
both sides. The LTTE has taken the stance that the next round of
negotiations must be based solely on its proposal for an Interim Self
Governing Authority (ISGA) in the North and East of Sri Lanka put
forward in October 2003, whereas the GOSL has insisted that the next
round of negotiations must be on all available proposals for an Interim
Authority (IA), provided the IA as well as the final settlement, is
based on the Oslo decision of December 5, 2002.
The Oslo decision was one of the most significant achievements of the
six rounds of peace talks, a paradigm shift, where the GOSL and the LTTE
agreed ‘to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal
self-determination, based on a federal structure within a united Sri
Lanka’.
This was a significant breakthrough towards an enduring
political settlement of the island's armed conflict. It was an
indication that the LTTE was willing to give up its demand for a
separate state, i.e. external self-determination and that the GOSL was
willing to consider constitutional reforms to accommodate a federal
system of devolution and power sharing. The LTTE in recent times have
however refused to even refer to their commitment to power sharing on
the basis of a federal solution.
A factor which I believe has contributed to the current impasse and the
intransigence of the LTTE on the agenda, is the internecine violence in
the East of Sri Lanka as a result of the defection of Karuna, the leader
of the Eastern command of the LTTE in March 2004. He demanded that the
GOSL and Nordic monitors recognise his group as an entity separate from
the LTTE under the CFA. The LTTE’s preoccupation with neutralizing
Karuna cadres in the East has certainly influenced their approach to
negotiations with the GOSL.
In this context where the LTTE appears to be shying away from any direct
contact with the GOSL whether on core issues relating to the peace
process or on issues related to the CFA, the negotiations leading to the
signing by the LTTE and the GOSL of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
for the establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure
(P-TOMS) has to be seen as a significant milestone. Following the
tsunami of December 26th last year, the GOSL and the LTTE embarked on
several rounds of technical level negotiations to discuss an arrangement
for equitable allocation of tsunami aid which would be acceptable to
both parties. Based on these discussions which were facilitated by the
Norwegians a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed upon and signed by
the two parties on 24th June 2005. The joint structure envisaged by the
MOU is broadly as follows:
It is a three-tiered structure comprising a high level committee at the
national level, a regional committee for the North and the East, and
District Committees in the 6 Districts of the North and the East
affected by the tsunami.
The High Level Committee comprising one GOSL, one LTTE and one Muslim
member will be responsible for the allocation of donor funds on the
basis of the needs assessments and in proportion to the number of
affected persons and the extent of damaged infrastructure.
The Regional Committee comprising 5 LTTE, 3 Muslim and 2 GOSL will be
responsible for development of strategies for implementation and
prioritization of post tsunami work, project approval and management,
and overall monitoring of projects.
The District Committees will be responsible for identification and
prioritization of needs, preparing and receiving project proposals and
monitoring and reporting on project progress to the regional committee.
At the regional level a fund will be established comprising donor funds
for relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development projects in
the tsunami affected areas of the North and the East.
Safeguards for the Muslims and Sinhala communities have been built into
the structure and adequate space created for non LTTE parties and civil
society to function at the District Committee level.
The implementation of this MOU has, however, been
delayed due to a stay order issued by the Supreme Court on some
provisions of the MOU relating to the Regional Fund and the Regional
Committee in response to a petition filed by the JVP, a southern
political party.
The Muslims have also expressed their dissatisfaction with the process
as well as some of the substantive provisions of the MOU and withheld
their cooperation to implement the MOU.
The problems in implementing the P-TOMS MOU has highlighted most vividly
one of the fundamental challenges facing the peace process which goes
beyond the current impasse between the GOSL and the LTTE - the Muslim
dimension. Given the nature of the conflict, Sri Lanka’s peace process
has been very much a bi-lateral interaction between the GOSL and the
LTTE with very little space for the participation of Muslims and also
other stakeholders such as non-LTTE Tamil political parties, southern
political formations and civil society groups.
Although Muslims were not a party to the conflict in Sri Lanka, they
have been demanding a place at the negotiating table based on their
identity as a separate ethnic and religious group as well as being
equally affected by the conflict. As the conflict progressed Muslims
experienced violence and oppression at the hands of the LTTE over
disagreements on the nature of a separate state as espoused by the LTTE,
and the status of Muslims within the North and the East. When the LTTE
realized that the Muslims were not willing to be subsumed under the
category of ‘Tamil speaking people’ and have their political rights
suppressed, Muslims in the North and the East became a target of LTTE
violence.
In October 1990, in an attempt at ethnic cleansing, more
than 80,000 Muslims living in the Northern Province were expelled from
their homes by the LTTE, some of who are still languishing in refugee
camps in the South. The security of Muslims in the East was also
severely affected, and continues to be an issue of concern today.
Although at the fourth round of peace talks both parties agreed to
include Muslims in the negotiations at the appropriate time when
considering relevant and substantial political issues, the LTTE does not
appear to be ready to recognise and accommodate Muslims as a third and
distinct party in the negotiating process. For instance the LTTE refused
to accede to a Muslim demand - strongly supported by the Government - to
be a co-signatory to the P-TOMS MOU.
The P-TOMS MOU has also highlighted another problem - divisions within
the southern polity which can undermine the peace efforts of incumbent
governments. Sri Lanka has a boisterous democracy which accommodates a
multiplicity of political opinions. In Sri Lanka, as in other conflict
situations, some of the core issues dividing society - the nature of the
state, power-sharing, etc.,- have become extremely politicized issues,
and some political parties have been using these issues to deepen the
divisions in society and enhance their own support base.
Despite these endemic problems, I strongly believe that the prospects
for peace in Sri Lanka are strong. My reasons are as follows:-
Firstly, despite the enormous strain that has been put on the ceasefire
Agreement, the present ceasefire is the longest cessation of hostilities
to date since 1983. The ceasefire celebrated three years on 23rd
February this year. Although there have been numerous ceasefire
violations there have been no direct military confrontations with the
LTTE. The CFA has helped to save lives and improved the quality of life
of people throughout the island. The GOSL for its part has repeatedly
stressed its firm commitment to the CFA, despite continued and grave
provocations by the LTTE, including the recent assassination of the
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.
The ceasefire has also facilitated humanitarian and development
assistance in the war ravaged North and the East of Sri Lanka, including
in the LTTE dominated districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi. This is
an area where the two sides have been able to cooperate so far with the
support of the international donor community, UN agencies and the
business sector in Sri Lanka. The GOSL is strongly committed to
continuing and enhancing its development activities in the North and the
East.
Three years after the CFA, people in the North and the East are enjoying
the benefits of a peace dividend. Development is an investment in a
permanent peace. Let me now identify some of the very specific
programmes being undertaken in the North and the East, since the
ceasefire was signed.
The RRR Ministry with donor assistance is at present implementing an
impressive number of projects which include resettlement of internally
displaced persons and assistance to host communities, rehabilitation of
provision of basic physical infrastructure such as roads, irrigation
programmes, power, and communication facilities as well as rebuilding of
social and community services such as health, education, sanitation and
judicial services. The CFA has also enabled the return of a large number
of refugees mainly from India.
Consequent to the Ceasefire Agreement, a comprehensive programme for
demining is being coordinated and implemented by the GOSL during the
last 2 years with the objective of having a “Mine Free Sri Lanka”.
Assistance from the USA has been a notable feature of this programme.
Perhaps as a direct result of these efforts, GDP in the Northern and the
Eastern Province has shown remarkable growth. According to research done
by the Economic Affairs division of my office, the highest GDP growth
rates during the post-CFA period are in the Northern Province (12.6% per
annum) and in the Eastern Province (10.1% per annum.), in contrast to
other provinces in Sri Lanka. The engine of growth in the North and the
East during the post-CFA has been the agricultural sector with the
industrial and service sectors also making useful contributions; rice
production in the North and the East has reached pre-conflict levels and
recorded a surplus during the last harvest. Unemployment in the Northern
Province is also the lowest in Sri Lanka at 5.8%, whereas the national
average is 8.9%. In the Eastern Province the rate is 8.4%.
The GOSL is looking to further support these developments, through
investment promotion strategies specific to the conflict-affected areas.
Attracting private-sector investment in troubled areas is never easy and
the government is negotiating a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) facility to promote investment in the North and the East. MIGA is
the political risk insurance arm of the World Bank which promotes
foreign direct investment in developing countries by insuring against
political risk and by providing technical assistance.
Secondly, despite changes in the political leadership,
government policy in relation to the peace process has remained fairly
stable in the last few years. The present peace process could be said to
have been initiated by H.E. the President. The United National Front
government headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe consolidated it
in 2002 with the CFA. The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA)
government which came into office in April 2004, again pledged to
respect the CFA, and continue facilitation by Norwegians to resume peace
talks. Sri Lanka is today at the threshold of a Presidential election to
be held later this year, when the Presidency will change after a period
of eleven (11) years. I am confident that whichever candidate comes to
office, this process will be continued. It must.
Thirdly, despite a strident and vocal anti peace lobby, there is a
strong public support base for a peaceful settlement to the conflict.
Professionally conducted opinion polls by independent organizations in
our country have revealed the full extent of the peace constituency in
Sri Lanka especially at the grassroots. The most recent polls reveal
that 76.7% across all ethnic groups want a permanent solution through
negotiations.
Fourthly, there is a whole gamut of civil society organizations working
for peace in Sri Lanka, and involved in a diversity of activities such
as lobbying, researching and mobilizing community level peace building.
As you know, the role of civil society in building peace cannot be
underestimated. Civil society played a significant role in conflict
resolution in a number of countries including in South Africa, in
Northern Ireland, in Colombia, and in Chile. In Sri Lanka, civil society
groups are making a significant contribution to the peace building
effort by strengthening and supporting the peace constituency. The
establishment of a National Advisory Council for Peace and
Reconciliation last year with Political, Religious and Civil Society
Committees is intended to foster a national dialogue on conflict
resolution.
Here I would also like to refer to the potential role that can be played
by Diaspora communities both Sinhala and Tamil, in promoting peace and
reconciliation in Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora comprises an
estimated 700,000 people living mainly in Canada, Europe, India and
Australia. The negative role played by the Tamil Diaspora in sustaining
and fuelling 20 years of conflict in Sri Lanka through their remittances
is well known and well documented. The GOSL insists that the
international community must come down hard on LTTE front organizations
which continue to fund the LTTE’s war chest through various disguises as
charitable, cultural and even religious bodies abusing host country laws
and regulations.
Fifthly the interest and commitment of the international community,
bodes well for peace in Sri Lanka. The international influence and
support to the peace process in Sri Lanka has taken multiple forms be it
at the “Track 1” level of facilitation and monitoring of the CFA,
diplomacy and international pressure, or economic assistance for
humanitarian and development work. Key actors have been countries such
as Norway, USA, EU, Japan and India, as well as multilateral agencies
such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the UNDP. While
outside actors cannot enforce peace, external assistance, support,
pressure and sanctions where necessary will be vital to bring a
negotiated end to the conflict in Sri Lanka. Norway will continue as
facilitator and the SLMM will remain as CFA monitors. Their roles can be
forcefully supplemented by others such as by the UN in the human rights
field.
I would like to conclude on an optimistic note. Despite the daily sights
and sounds of conflict which fill our newspapers and television screens
worldwide, researchers are now saying that the prospects for peace in
the world today may be higher than it has ever been and that war itself
may be in decline.
This is in part due to the enormous international effort that is going
into peacemaking from international facilitation, mediation, to
multilateral peace keeping missions to international support for a
multitude of other peace building activities at various levels of the
community.
There is an emerging concept in international relations on the shared
responsibility of the world community to protect civilians wherever
their welfare is threatened.
The sovereign right and legal obligation of the democratically -elected
Sri Lanka Government to protect national security and her citizens from
terrorism and human rights violations by non-state actors like the LTTE
is primary and indisputable. But it requires the assistance of the
international community at this point of time. The discussions going on
at the United Nations show that the condemnation of terrorism is
universal and that acts of terrorism cannot be justified or legitimized
by any cause or grievance. There is one norm to judge terrorism wherever
it may occur in the world.
Intra-state conflicts like the Sri Lankan conflict have
international linkages in today’s globalized world. Financial flows help
purchase arms and ammunition in foreign countries to be smuggled in to
Sri Lanka and thwart the peace process. If the security consensus to be
endorsed by the 60th UN Anniversary Summit in New York this week,
emphasizing the interlinking of development, peace, security and human
rights, is to be implemented in Sri Lanka, international cooperation is
vital for the peace process to be strengthened.
Peace is indeed a process, not a static goal. It is a dynamic, complex
and difficult process. The recent Peace Agreement that was signed by the
government of Indonesia and the rebel Free Aceh Movement, came after
twenty-nine (29) years of conflict. The historic declaration made by the
IRA in July this year, to disarm and work for a united Ireland through
peaceful means, came after thirty six (36) years of waging war.
In both countries, there have been many failed attempts
at peace before, and the future yet remains to be determined. It is not
unlikely that good news of a similar nature can come from my own country
with the right political will and the right decisions made by the
parties to the conflict. John Paul Lederach, the acclaimed peace-builder
and scholar, once observed that getting out of a conflict can take as
long as it takes to get into a conflict.
It means that those of us, who are committed to the
cause of peace, have to work a little harder and longer before we can
realize that dream. As the Chinese adage - which I never tire of quoting
- says. “The more you sweat in peace; the less you bleed in war”. |
