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From
the Conclusion:
"... Though a diagram would show LTTE as standing alone and independent from all
the other groupings, this is of course not quite true. Communication lines and common
features at intersections between LTTE and other groups do exist, but these connections
are extremely loose and LTTE would never allow these connections or questions of party
loyalty to hamper a course of action they have embarked upon and consider vital. The
argument works also the other way round: LTTE would not let political or ideological
differences stand in the way of cooperation if this suits their political objectives,
provided they could keep control of the process as a senior partner.
Another point is even more important: As we have seen, quite obviously LTTE represent a
strand of political will and thinking which is extremely strong and entrenched among the
Tamils: a very conservative society with a deep feeling of its own worth and
national/ethnic pride is much more easily swayed by national appeals and arguments even if
they come wrapped up in socialist terminology, connected with a certain amount of social
discomfort and upheaval, than by Marxist visions of world revolution and the equality of
humankind.
The socialist stance, sincerely as it is peddled, is at best a thin veneer over a
profoundly indigenous and national movement. Yet at the same time, aims of equality and
social justice have been realised best by LTTE who are as mixed by caste and religion as
one could wish. And there lies another source of LTTE's strength: the undoubted support of
the movement depends on the mixture of deep loyalty to the culture and history of the
Tamils and an attempt at social reform. This loyalty to history and tradition is revealed
in the various ways described...
While the other groups claimed support and assistance from the population, LTTE was the
only group that could prove to have grassroots support and influence, a support which
enabled them to achieve military control. This was not solely based on military
superiority, which is, after all, a relative concept, but much more on the ideology of the
survival of the Tamil race,
Tamil
nation, Tamil language,
Tamil
culture and
Tamil homeland...
Without doubt, the pattern of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka shows may
similarities to other independence or liberation movements, especially in its arrangement
of liberation groups and their ideology and the return to a glorious past which is
recalled in sentimental terms. But the reason for the success of this particular strand of
ideology (a fact which could become dangerous if Eelam is achieved) must lie somewhere in
the direction Tamil culture took in the past, which determines the shape of Tamil
nationalism of today.
This is the direction in which we have to try to marshal our research and
our argument. There are more questions than answers here, and the answers may take a long
time coming, since research on the Tamil militants has only just begun. But they are
necessary questions if we want to come to a just evaluation of the role and significance
of these militants in the context of Tamil society and Tamil politics. Kapferer's
deterministic conclusion that violence is inherent and constitutive in Sinhalese ontology
and cultural concepts is debatable in the Sinhalese context, and certainly not applicable
in the Tamil case, the present cult of violence by the LTTE notwithstanding.
And what have the Tigers gained? Blood, sweat and tears, military control of Jaffna and a
reputation for determination, tenacity, fanaticism and ruthlessness. On the negative side,
isolation, loss of world sympathy and revulsion after Rajiv Gandhi's death and the loss of
their fall-back bases and supply lines in India. All LTTE's successes up till now have
been achieved out of the barrel of a gun, but can this go on?
One day the Tigers will have to enter the political process. And that is
the point: experienced fighters they are, whether they are clever politicians is open to
doubt. This is not at all a problem of intellectual ability, but of political naivete and
inexperience which the Tigers display to a quite unbelievable degree. It says a lot for
them, that a group of militants not versed in the wiles of their lawyer elders have come
so far at all, but that does not lessen the difficulties. It was easy to take Kokkavil and
Mankulam, to drive the army out of Jaffna Fort, but it is quite a different task to get
normal life going again. LTTE admit openly that they have great difficulties there. And in
order to guard against their own mistakes and others taking advantage of them, they will
keep their weapons and for the present rely on force majeure.
Prospects for peace in Sri Lanka look grim indeed. The situation is tragic not only for
the Tamil population, but the members of LTTE themselves, too. It is the tragedy of the
Sri Lankan Tamils' schizophrenia, torn between Sri Lanka and India in the search for their
identity. They have a choice of identities and histories to
draw upon, but instead of offering a chance and providing a means of transcending
ethnic or linguistic boundaries, this choice of identities and pasts has become their
greatest problem. It causes them to
veer
wildly between India and Sri Lanka, alternately rejecting both and being repulsed in
turn. This is the Tamils' own ethnic hell, and the real tragedy is that
Satyendra and even the LTTE
saw what was coming, but were, for all their attempts, powerless to prevent it."
